# Round 1 Neg V ASU CM

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#### A) Interpretation – The Federal Government is the one in D.C.

**Dictionary of American politics**, 2nd edition, 19**68**.

Federal government: in the united states: the government which, from its capital in the district of Columbia, directly legislates, administers, and exercises jurisdiction over matters assigned to it in the constitution and exerts considerable influence, by means of grants-in-aid and otherwise, over matters reserved to the state governments.

### 1nc Long

#### First --- discussions of US energy policy should prioritize national security as a starting point --- the role of the ballot is to affirm this agenda, not the aff’s endless ontological investigation

Wirth, Gray, & Podesta 2003 Timothy E. Wirth is President of the United Nations Foundation and a former U.S. Senator from Colorado. C. Boyden Gray is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served as Counsel to former President George H.W. Bush, The Future of Energy Policy, Foreign Affairs, July-August, pp. LN, KEL

**Energy is fundamental to U.S. domestic prosperity and national security**. In fact, **the complex ties** between energy and U.S. national interests **have drawn tighter over time**. **The advent of globalization, the growing gap between rich and poor, the war on terrorism, and the need to safeguard the earth's environment are all intertwined with energy concerns**. **The profound changes of recent decades and the pressing challenges of the twenty-first century warrant recognizing energy's central role in America's future and the need for much more ambitious and creative approaches**. Yet the current debate about U.S. energy policy is mainly about tax breaks for expanded production, access to public lands, and nuances of electricity regulation -- difficult issues all, but inadequate for the larger challenges the United States faces. The staleness of the policy dialogue reflects a failure to recognize the importance of energy to the issues it affects: defense and homeland security**, the economy, and the environment.** ***What is needed is a purposeful, strategic energy policy***, not a grab bag drawn from interest-group wish lists. U.S. energy policies to date have failed to address three great challenges. The first is the danger to political and economic security posed by the world's dependence on oil. Next is the risk to the global environment from climate change, caused primarily by the combustion of fossil fuels. Finally, the lack of access by the world's poor to modern energy services, agricultural opportunities, and other basics needed for economic advancement is a deep concern. None of these problems of dependence, climate change, or poverty can be solved overnight, but aggressive goals and practical short-term initiatives can jump-start the move to clean and secure energy practices. The key challenges can be overcome with a blend of carefully targeted policy interventions that build on the power of the market, public-private partnerships in financing and technology development, and, perhaps most important, the development of a political coalition that abandons traditional assumptions and brings together energy interests that have so far engaged only in conflict. **Turning this ambitious, long-term agenda into reality requires a sober assessment of the United States' critical energy challenges and the interests that can be mobilized for the necessary political change.**

#### This approach to energy policy is necessary to preserve US global leadership --- embracing technological thought and managerial ordering is crucial

Klarevas ‘09

(Louis, Professor, Center for Global Affairs, New York University “Securing American Primacy While Tackling Climate Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony,” pg online @ <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy_b_393223.html>)

As national leaders from around the world are gathering in Copenhagen, Denmark, to attend the United Nations Climate Change Conference, the time is ripe to re-assess America's current energy policies - but within the larger framework of how a new approach on the environment will stave off global warming and shore up American primacy. By not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is squandering an opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to come. To do this, though, the U.S. must **rely on innovation** to help the world escape the coming environmental meltdown. Developing the key technologies that will save the planet from global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver potential great power rivals seeking to replace it as the international system's hegemon. But the greening of American strategy must occur soon. The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time, unable to move beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals. Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount environmental issues as they are not seen as advancing national interests in a way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system: Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might very well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews narrowly defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is, above all, to protect and promote American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green fighting machine, the U.S. can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every nation, while at the same time, securing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not just your traditional hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon. Hegemons are countries that dominate the international system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the most important international institutions, and covering the costs that result from free-riding and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the United States. Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S., emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar (and current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from America's new-found hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the impending systemic crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way that will benefit both the international community collectively and the U.S. selfishly. The current problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities between the major powers. The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum contest could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens American primacy and global stability. Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions. So long as the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are predicting as much as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years. That likely means more devastating water shortages, droughts, forest fires, floods, and storms. In other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability. Oil arguably has been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The key resource for this century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power. Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this, the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must drastically increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice, committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently being spent. By promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles; improving public transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will not only provide alternatives to oil, they will also give the U.S. **an edge in the global competition for hegemony**. If the U.S. is able to produce technologies that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will eventually have no choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a tremendous economic boom, while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that can be employed to keep potential foes in check. The bottom-line is that the U.S. needs to become green energy dominant as opposed to black energy independent - and the best approach for achieving this is to promote a national strategy of greengemony.

#### Second, the aff’s reliance on ontological politics and abstract theorization is incompatible with our starting point --- philosophical approaches to this year’s resolution are insufficient to produce a coherent reaction to global events

Whitington ‘12

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Accounting for Atmosphere: The Anthropology of Climate Change is a project with the objective of building collaborative project appropriate to the challenge of understanding something as complex as climate change. Rather, the objective is to approach climate change with enough specificity that precise empirical statements can be linked with the broad significance of climate change’s global scope and geo-historical timescales.

5-27-12, Critical Theory Climate Blah Blah <http://accountingforatmosphere.wordpress.com/2012/03/27/critical-theory-climate-blah-blah/>, jj

Over the past several weeks I’ve become motivated to closely examine critical theory approaches to climate change. Most recently, I’ve been inspired by the limitations of object-oriented philosophy or what some are calling speculative realism, such as Levi Bryant’s recent lament that there is no hope for the climate and we might as well consign ourselves to a potlatch fossil energy conflagration. Bruno Latour’s now famous argument ‘From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern’ also hinges on climate change and, like Bryant’s, it is also inadequate from any empirically-informed stand point. But so what? Does it matter to critical theory? Does critical theory matter to a social science of climate change? The real question, it seems to me, is not to hammer the philosophy-types because they aren’t empirically grounded – nothing could be more pointless from my view – but rather to ask whether work that’s a little less caught up in the intricacies of practice can help formulate relevant questions for an empirically-informed ‘fieldwork in philosophy.’ In other words, what is needed is neither a catalog of minutae nor theory from the troposphere, but a range of meso theorizations that provide a grasp on contemporary transformations. The loud sucking noise created from the collapse of Foucault-inspired critical social science in the US hasn’t really abated much over the past few years. My own dissatisfaction with the range of alternatives – Latour, Deleuze, whatever – has been heightened by the totally unsurprising realization in the course of my dissertation writing that those approaches has little to say about what was patently important in the field, and even less of a commitment to sussing out the demands empirical work should make on theory. To top it off, I still find convincing Rabinow’s proposition that we shouldn’t be doing theory. Rather, the challenge is to identify what’s critical and then create the necessary equipment. Subsequently, the conceptual work I have found most useful has been far less over-arching, less tied to any God-figure, and a lot more mobile. But a specific disappointment remains – namely, whether there is capacity to think the broader significance of events or processes such as climate change, beyond the analytical demands. In other words, maybe even if we’re still within the space created when life enters history, the bottom up approach of analyzing ‘practices, instruments and techniques’ (as a recent very awesome workshop hosted by Amy Levine and Andrea Ballestero pegged it) seems insufficient to the scale of the transformations we are witnessing. Granted, we are so close to so many potentially monumental historical moments. One doesn’t even know what questions to ask when scientists begin formulating concepts like Anthropocene, or for that matter when geothermal engineers trigger swarms of earthquakes by injecting pressurized water kilometers deep in seismically active fault zones. At the very least we are at an intensely generative moment. But the other side of the analytical coin is that our critical tools for understanding culture – power – history are really good now. I mean, they are fabulously good. The wealth of critical resources, far from having played themselves out, have instead obviated many of the questions that motivated them. When I started the Accounting for Atmosphere project, two overarching framings dominated: first, that the political project of dealing with climate change was to create a global regime to manage atmospheric chemistry; and second, that the primary technical mode for this dwelt on intensive quantification regimes at several scales (national carbon budgets, carbon finance (markets), and enterprise accounting (businesses, etc). All of this still holds, and many of the practices, instruments and techniques in play are excited loci of dynamic transformation. Indeed, there is a rapidly expanding literature on carbon markets, including luminaries such as Donald MacKenzie and Michel Callon. On the other hand, there is Critical Theory Climate Blah Blah, which is sort of like Video Killed the Radio Star, I mean, there are a host of old and new hats weighing in on climate change who just don’t know much about it, or maybe they know something, a little bit, but are prone to speculation because they too easily recognize in climate change their own specific intellectual commitments. Let me take an example I like: Peter Sloterdijk’s nifty Semiotext(e) volume Terror from the Air. To me, this is an exciting book – I very much sympathize with how he formulates a problematic around chemical warfare in terms of a trio of environment, design and atmosphere. But Sloterdijk’s short little passage on climate change just doesn’t cut it. It’s banal. It’s generic. Climate is a stand in for what he already thinks. At any rate, it’s just one example. Another example – one I really have not much sympathy for – is Brian Massumi’s ‘National Enterprise Emergency: Steps toward an ecology of powers’ (TCS, 2009).

#### Next the impacts:

#### We control macro uniqueness. Statistics prove hegemony is decreasing violence --- be skeptical of claims that the “standing reserve” makes violence inevitable

Owen 11 John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and men dacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

#### Hegemony turns environmental concerns outlined in the 1ac

Ashok Khosla 9, IUCN President, International Union for Conservation of Nature, A new President for the United States: We have a dream, 1-29-09, http://cms.iucn.org/news\_events/?uNewsID=2595

A rejuvenated America, with a renewed purpose, commitment and energy to make its contribution once again towards a better world could well be the turning point that can reverse the current decline in the state of the global economy, the health of its life support systems and the morale of people everywhere. This extraordinary change in regime brings with it the promise of a deep change in attitudes and aspirations of Americans, a change that will lead, hopefully, to new directions in their nation’s policies and action. In particular, we can hope that from being a very reluctant partner in global discussions, especially on issues relating to environment and sustainable development, the United States will become an active leader in international efforts to address the Millennial threats now confronting civilization and even the survival of the human species. For the conservation of biodiversity, so essential to maintaining life on Earth, this promise of change has come not a moment too soon. It would be a mistake to put all of our hopes on the shoulder of one young man, however capable he might be. The environmental challenges the world is facing cannot be addressed by one country, let alone by one man. At the same time, an inspired US President guided by competent people, who does not shy away from exercising the true responsibilities and leadership his country is capable of, could do a lot to spur the international community into action. To paraphrase one of his illustrious predecessors, “the world asks for action and action now.” What was true in President Roosevelt’s America 77 years ago is even more appropriate today. From IUCN’s perspective, the first signals are encouraging. The US has seriously begun to discuss constructive engagement in climate change debates. With Copenhagen a mere 11 months away, this commitment is long overdue and certainly very welcome. Many governments still worry that if they set tough standards to control carbon emissions, their industry and agriculture will become uncompetitive, a fear that leads to a foot-dragging “you go first” attitude that is blocking progress. A positive intervention by the United States could provide the vital catalyst that moves the basis of the present negotiations beyond the narrowly defined national interests that lie at the heart of the current impasse. The logjam in international negotiations on climate change should not be difficult to break if the US were to lead the industrialized countries to agree that much of their wealth has been acquired at the expense of the environment (in this case greenhouse gases emitted over the past two hundred years) and that with the some of the benefits that this wealth has brought, comes the obligation to deal with the problems that have resulted as side-effects. With equitable entitlement to the common resources of the planet, an agreement that is fair and acceptable to all nations should be easy enough to achieve. Caps on emissions and sharing of energy efficient technologies are simply in the interest of everyone, rich or poor. And both rich and poor must now be ready to adopt less destructive technologies – based on renewables, efficiency and sustainability – both as a goal with intrinsic merit and also as an example to others. But climate is not the only critical global environmental issue that this new administration will have to deal with. Conservation of biodiversity, a crucial prerequisite for the wellbeing of all humanity, no less America, needs as much attention, and just as urgently. The United States’ self-interest in conserving living natural resources strongly converges with the global common good in every sphere: in the oceans, by arresting the precipitate decline of fish stocks and the alarming rise of acidification; on land, by regenerating the health of our soils, forests and rivers; and in the atmosphere by reducing the massive emission of pollutants from our wasteful industries, construction, agriculture and transport systems.

#### Decline causes extinction

Nye 91 (Joseph, Bound to Lead, p.17)

Perceptions of change in the relative power of nations are of critical importance to understanding the relations between decline and war. One of the oldest generalizations about international politics attributes the onset of major wars to shifts in power among the leading nations. Thus Thucydides accounted for the onset of the Peloponnesian War which destroyed the power of ancient Athens. The history of the interstate system since 1500 is punctuated by severe wars in which one country struggled to surpass another as the leading state. If, as Robert Gilpin argues, “international politics has not changed fundamentally over the millennia,” the implications for the future are bleak. And if fears about shifting power precipitate a major war in a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, history as we know it may end.

#### That comes first

Robin **Attfield**, Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University, “The Ethics of the Global Environment”, Perdue University Press, 19**99**, pg 68

Nevertheless, as John Leslie has remarked, many philosophers write as if there were no reason for preserving the human species beyond obligations either to the dead or to the living, and some as if there would be nothing wrong with allowing the species to extinguish itself, or even with actively extinguishing it ourselves, well before this would happen in the ordinary course of events. Now the argument concerning the value of ongoing current activities already shows that the verdicts that there would be nothing wrong with allowing (let alone causing) premature extinction are unsupportable; for the prospect of premature human extinction deprives many (but not all) widespread current activities of their meaning and value. But, as has just been argued, there must be something else to explain the strength of the imperative not to allow or to make premature extinction come about, and to explain what it is that makes most people who contemplate the possibility of premature human extinction regard it as appalling. Cicero makes a parallel point: 'As we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare that they care not if when they themselves are dead the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake.'23  Likewise the consequentialist ethic introduced and defended in Chapter 2 maintains that future people have moral standing (and future living creatures of other species too). Future generations have this standing even though their existence is contingent on current generations and the identity of future individuals is unknown at present; the good or ill of individuals who could be brought into existence count as reasons for or against actions or policies which would bring them into being. This in turn implies that where the existence beyond a certain date of individuals likely to lead happy, worthwhile or flourishing lives can be facilitated or prevented, there is an obligation not to prevent it, other things being equal. This does not mean that everyone should be continually having children; other things are seldom equal, and problems of human numbers mean that acting on this basis could easily produce overextended families, countries or regions, or an overpopulated planet, where extra people would spell misery for themselves and for the others (see Chapter 7). But it does mean that each life likely to be of positive quality comprises a reason for its own existence, and that countervailing reasons of matching strength (concerning the disvalue of adding this life) are required to neutralise such a reason.  There are many other implications, including the importance of planning for the needs of future generations (considered in later chapters). A further implication, more relevant here, is that humanity should not be allowed to become extinct, insofar as this is within human control, even if, foreseeably, a small minority of any given generation will lead lives of negative quality (lives which are either not positively worth living or actually worth not living), as long as, overall, the lives of that generation are of positive quality, and the positive intrinsic value of worthwhile lives outweighs the intrinsic disvalue of the lives of misery. Since each generation is highly likely to include some lives which are not worth living, however hard its members and their predecessors may try to raise the quality of these lives, this implication makes all the difference to the issue of whether causing or even allowing the extinction of humanity is a moral crime.  People who think that preventing misery is always of the greatest importance have to take the view that human extinction should be tolerated or even advocated; but the consequentialist ethic defended here says otherwise. So, of course, say the widespread intuitions reviewed earlier. A modified version of one of John Leslie's thought-experiments could be used to test much the same issue. On each of numerous inhabitable planets, capable of supporting a large human population, whose members would predictably lead lives of positive quality, there will also be a person whose life will predictably and inevitably be of negative quality. For the purposes of the thought-experiment, these large human populations can be brought into existence by waving a magic wand. Should this be done? For consequentialists who believe in optimising the balance of intrinsic value over intrinsic disvalue, and in counting every actual and possible life as having moral standing, the answer is affirmative, even though the resulting population of each planet includes a life of negative quality.  But theorists who prioritise the prevention of misery would have to hold that the answer depends entirely on whether the life of negative quality on each planet can be prevented; if it cannot, then none of these lives should be engendered. (Others too, including consequentialists, might also take this view if the addition of human lives were liable to harm the living creatures of these same planets; to make this thought-experiment a test case, we need to adopt the further assumption that no such harm would be done.)   This thought-experiment also has a bearing on human extinction. For the future of the Earth beyond a certain date (just after the death of the youngest person now alive) is in some ways similar to the situation of the planets just mentioned. The current generation could produce a population living then, most of them people with lives worth living, but only at the risk of producing a minority whose lives will foreseeably be miserable. If the happiness or the worthwhile lives of the majority do not count as reasons for generating those same lives, and hence nothing counts but the misery of the minority, or if the prevention of misery  should be prioritised over all else, then allowing extinction is clearly mandatory, and so may be even genocide. However, as Leslie claims, the coexistence of hundreds of thousands of lives of positive quality with one life of misery is not morally disastrous, if the misery of the miserable life really cannot be alleviated. 25 (If of course this misery could be alleviated, whether by contemporaries or by the previous generation, then this might well be a morally disastrous situation, and alleviation would almost certainly be obligatory.) Consequentialism, then, does not mandate extinction, unlike several of the theories which stand opposed to it.

#### And, imperialism K’s are wrong:

#### The US is not an empire or imperialist---arguments to the contrary encourage faulty scholarship

Spruyt, 08 (July 20, Hendrik, International Studies Perspectives, Volume 9, Issue 3: “’American Empire’ as an Analytic Question or a Rhetorical Move?” ts)

**Recent events have led to a renewed scholarly interest in empire and the question whether the United States and its policies abroad constitute an “American Empire.**” **This essay clarifies the various uses of the term and argues that conceptual overstretching retards scholarly analysis of the phenomenon**. This essay suggests a definition of the term “empire” and provides an ideal-typical reference point to study its empirical variations. I provide a typology of empires to guide the analysis of common features as well as distinguishing characteristics. We can then answer the question whether contemporary manifestations might differ from their historical precursors. **American unilateralist policy today differs in fundamental respects from previous imperial processes and structures.** In contradistinction with earlier empires, **U.S. policies lack the incentive structures for peripheral elites and local populations that typified imperial rule in the past**. While falling short of constituting a formal empire, its policies face the same contradictions that confronted the western maritime empires as well as the USSR and which led to their dismemberment. “Do not ask for the definition of a word. Ask how it is used.” (The Later Wittgenstein) **Scarcely two decades ago, international relations scholarship regarded “empire” as a largely obsolete historical phenomenon**. Profound analyses of empires such as those of Doyle (1986), Kahler (1984), and Smith (1981) studied imperial expansion from Rome to the Scramble of Africa, and, finally, decolonization and the end of empires. Decolonization after World War II enshrined a global system of sovereign territorial states. **In so far the term “empire” was invoked, it was meant to conjure negative images of one of the rival superpowers. It served rhetorical purposes rather than analytical objectives.**

#### Any alternative to US empire is utopian and impractical – would only risk more violence

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***Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission***, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure **and, in the most probable post-imperial world**, would revert to the logic of **self-help** in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

#### Securitization and calculation over energy resources is inevitable --- realism is the best approach to the topic

Dannreuther ‘10

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POLINARES working paper n. 8, POLINARES – EU Policy on Natural Resources, POLINARES is a project designed to help identify the main global challenges relating to competition for access to resources, and to propose new approaches to collaborative solutions,

September 2010, International Relations Theories: Energy, Minerals and Conflict, <http://www.polinares.eu/docs/d1-1/polinares_wp1_ir_theories.pdf>, jj

2. Realism, neo-Realism and Geopolitics

Realism is often seen historically as the dominant IR theory and this is certainly correct in terms of the study of security, conflict and war. This is reflected in the fact that International Security, as noted above the flagship IR journal, is dominated by realist and neo-realist authors. Classical realism includes the key early and mid-twentieth century scholars who developed a notion of the ‘tragic’ nature of international politics, arguing that there was a radical difference between politics within a state and politics between states since inter-state politics lacks any overarching sovereign arbiter who is able authoritatively to repress the inexorable drive for power and the natural human tendency towards aggression (for key texts, see Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1960; Neibuhr 1960). The logical consequence is that the international realm is chracterised by anarchy, distrust and the ever-present prospect of war. Much of realism’s initial momentum and subsequent popularity came from its critique of inter-war liberalism (or so-called idealism) and the optimism expressed by may liberals that international relations could be transformed through developing international law and international institutions such as the League of Nations (see especially Carr 1946). In 1979, Kenneth Waltz provided a more rigorous and parsimonious model of realism, known as neo-realism, whose main assumptions were that the international system is anarchical, that the structure of the system is determined by the distribution of power between states (the balance of power), and that the internal nature of the state (i.e. whether it is democratic or authoritarian) has no material structural impact on international relations (Waltz, 1979).

Realism’s theoretical principles draw from deeper historical traditions of thinking about international politics and these help to explain the theory’s popularity and theoretical dominance. This includes the tradition of realpolitik developed from Machiavelli onwards, which prioritises the interests of the sovereign, and where the key goal of statesmen seeking to preserve international stability is to contain the ineluctable drive for power by states, and the conflicts this inevitably produces, through the preservation of a durable balance of power. As Kissinger has described, this was the foundation of the European order in the 18th and 19th century (Kissinger 1964). It was an approach to international politics he also sought to resurrect to develop his own foreign policy principles when he was a highly influential US Secretary of State in the 1970s (Kissinger 1979, 1982). Another tradition which realism draws from is that of geopolitics which includes the work of people like Mahan (1890), Mackinder (1919), Haushofer, (2002) Harold and Margaret Spout (1971), and Lipschutz (1989). This tradition draws from geography as well as IR and strategic studies and highlights the spatial dimensions of state power and identifies a continued international struggle for influence and control of critical geographical and geopolitical spaces, whether that be the Eurasian ‘heartland’ favoured by Mackinder or the international sea lanes promoted by Mahan.

Much of the literature on the politics of international energy adopts implicitly a realist and geopolitical theoretical approach, even if this is rarely explicitly developed. The key underlying assumptions and arguments of those who adopt this approach can be reduced to the following:

• Access to and control of natural resources, of which energy is the most critical, is a key ingredient of national power and national interest

• Energy resources are becoming scarcer and more insecure (drawing often from the ‘peak oil’ thesis and the ‘resource curse’ and ‘resource wars’ literature)

• States will increasingly compete for access and control over these resources

• Conflict and war over these resources are increasingly likely, if not inevitable.

A good illustration of this general approach can be seen in the work of Michael Klare who has written prolifically on the international politics of energy and is probably the best-known and most popular writer in the field of IR and energy (see Klare 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008). The core arguments of his various books are essentially realist and can be distilled to:

• In the post-Cold War period, with the end of the ideological clash between socialism and capitalism and the rise of new economic powers, international relations is increasingly focused on gaining or maintaining access to and control of valuable natural resources, which is inextricably linked to the post-Cold War shifts in the balance of power. This is a major source of conflict between the most powerful states: US, China, Russia, EU, Japan, India…etc

• Natural resources, most notably oil, is becoming increasingly scarce due to rising demand in Asia and the prospect of ‘peak oil’.

• Much of the world’s supply of oil, and much of its new supplies such as in Central Asia and Africa, are located in weak, fragile states with multiple inter-state disputes and conflicts and where political and religious extremism is rising. Oil wealth has the paradoxical effect of making these states more powerful international actors, due to their control of vital resources, but also more dysfunctional, more ‘dissatisfied’, revisionist, authoritarian and anti-Western. A link is to be found between resource wealth and the post 9/11 growth of radical Islam and the threat of international terrorism.

• International conflict over oil and other natural resources is thus becoming more and more likely.

This general overarching thesis is undoubtedly a powerful and persuasive framework which captures the political imagination of many analysts and policy-makers, and which needs to be taken into account even by those who might disagree with the underlying assumptions. Such an approach feeds, for example, the concerns of the Chinese leadership see that the insecurity of the Malacca straits, and the prospect of a military embargo of its oil supplies, represents a fundamental threat to China’s core national interests; similarly, it underlay the concerns of the US Congress that CNOOC’s bid for UNOCAL in 2005 would, if successful, represent a critical threat to US national interests and its energy security. It is a theoretical frame which suffuses military planning, such as that of the Pentagon or the PLA or the Russian armed forces, and promotes national defence strategies which incorporate policies to defend perceived vulnerable energy supply sources and transportation routes. It also feeds into more alarmist policy and journalistic accounts of international relations where there has been a burgeoning literature about the new ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia, which pits Russia, China and the West in a zero-sum game for control over the region’s energy resources (see Blank 1995; Karasac 2002; Rasizade 2002; Jafar 2004). Similarly, the emergence of a renewed ‘scramble for Africa’ which focuses on the increased global interest in the natural resources of Africa, most notable of which is oil, and which has made this region regain strategic importance and which has incited great power competition (Morris 2006; Taylor 2006; Frynas and Paulo 2007). This realist-driven energy conflict approach also suffuses Western concerns over the rise of China, the fears of Chinese expansion in Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the prospect of increased conflict between China and its regional neighbours, Russia, Japan and India.

#### Empirical reality validates security problems

Liotta 5 (PH, Professor of Humanities and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University, security dialogue 36:1 "through the looking glass: creeping vulnerabilities and the reordering of security")

**Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions** (Grayson, 2003), **all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice**. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, **we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises**. We are nowhere closer to addressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the **creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement. Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment.**

#### Prefer this form of knowledge

Walt, ‘5 – Prof, Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard (Stephen M., Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2005. 8:23–48, pg. 25-26, “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” <http://www.iheid.ch/webdav/site/political_science/shared/political_science/3452/walt.pdf>)

Policy decisions can be influenced by several types of knowledge. First, policy makers invariably rely on purely factual knowledge (e.g., how large are the opponent’s forces? What is the current balance of payments?). Second, decision makers sometimes employ “rules of thumb”: simple decision rules acquired through experience rather than via systematic study (Mearsheimer 1989).3 A third type of knowledge consists of typologies, which classify phenomena based on sets of specific traits. Policy makers can also rely on empirical laws. An empirical law is an observed correspondence between two or more phenomena that systematic inquiry has shown to be reliable. Such laws (e.g., “democracies do not fight each other” or “human beings are more risk averse with respect to losses than to gains”) can be useful guides even if we do not know why they occur, or if our explanations for them are incorrect. Finally, policy makers can also use theories. A theory is a causal explanation— it identifies recurring relations between two or more phenomena and explains why that relationship obtains. By providing us with a picture of the central forces that determine real-world behavior, theories invariably simplify reality in order to render it comprehensible. At the most general level, theoretical IR work consists of “efforts by social scientists. . .to account for interstate and trans-state processes, issues, and outcomes in general causal terms” (Lepgold & Nincic 2001, p. 5; Viotti & Kauppi 1993). IR theories offer explanations for the level of security competition between states (including both the likelihood of war among particular states and the warproneness of specific countries); the level and forms of international cooperation (e.g., alliances, regimes, openness to trade and investment); the spread of ideas, norms, and institutions; and the transformation of particular international systems, among other topics. In constructing these theories, IR scholars employ an equally diverse set of explanatory variables. Some of these theories operate at the level of the international system, using variables such as the distribution of power among states (Waltz 1979, Copeland 2000, Mearsheimer 2001), the volume of trade, financial flows, and interstate communications (Deutsch 1969, Ruggie 1983, Rosecrance 1986); or the degree of institutionalization among states (Keohane 1984, Keohane & Martin 2003). Other theories emphasize different national characteristics, such as regime type (Andreski 1980, Doyle 1986, Fearon 1994, Russett 1995), bureaucratic and organizational politics (Allison & Halperin 1972, Halperin 1972), or domestic cohesion (Levy 1989); or the content of particular ideas or doctrines (Van Evera 1984, Hall 1989, Goldstein & Keohane 1993, Snyder 1993). Yet another family of theories operates at the individual level, focusing on individual or group psychology, gender differences, and other human traits (De Rivera 1968, Jervis 1976, Mercer 1996, Byman&Pollock 2001, Goldgeier&Tetlock 2001, Tickner 2001, Goldstein 2003), while a fourth body of theory focuses on collective ideas, identities, and social discourse (e.g., Finnemore 1996, Ruggie 1998, Wendt 1999). To develop these ideas, IR theorists employ the full range of social science methods: comparative case studies, formal theory, large-N statistical analysis, and hermeneutical or interpretivist approaches.

#### US them binaries are necessary to prevent relapse into total violence

Reinhard 4 – Kenneth Reinhard, Professor of Jewish Studies at UCLA, 2004, “Towards a Political Theology- Of the Neighbor,” online: <http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards_Political_Theology.pdf>

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. **A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms** that flourished as recently as the Cold War **is one subject to radical instability**, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: **The effects of this destruction would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam?** Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, **the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis**: **since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stability**, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, **the loss of the enemy** threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something **causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia**. Hence, for Schmitt, **a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies;** as Derrida writes, **the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous –forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable”**

### Case

#### No impact to standing reserve – the state won’t eliminate impure populations

**Dickinson 4** (UC Berkeley – History, Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But **that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading**, because **it obfuscates the profoundly different** strategic and local **dynamics of power in the** two kinds of **regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism**. Above all, again, **it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism** (or for that matter Stalinism), **the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder**. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. **Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian** or totalitarian **structures.** And **this pursuit of biopolitical ends through** a regime of **democratic citizenship does appear**, historically, **to have imposed** increasingly **narrow limits on coercive policies, and to** have **generate**d **a “logic”** or imperative **of increasing liberalization**. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

***They have it backwards – large-scale violence leads to structural violence***

**Goldstein, ’01** (Joshua S., Professor of International Relations at American University, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, pp.411-412)

I began this book hoping to contribute in some way to a deeper understanding of war – an understanding that would improve the chances of someday achieving real peace, by deleting war from our human repertoire. In following the thread of gender running through war, I found the deeper understanding I had hoped for – a multidisciplinary and multilevel engagement with the subject. Yet I became somewhat more pessimistic about how quickly or easily war may end. The war system emerges, from the evidence in this book, as relatively ubiquitous and robust. Efforts to change this system must overcome several dilemmas mentioned in this book. First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

***Case doesn’t turn disad – prefer our proximate internal links – they overdetermine war***

Scott D. **Sagan** – Department of Political Science, Stanford University – ACCIDENTAL WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE – **2000** – available via: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/sagan.doc

To make reasonable judgements in such matters **it is essential**, in my view, **to avoid the common "fallacy of overdetermination."**  Looking backwards at historical events, it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of a war **and argue that the** likelihood of conflict was so high that the **war would have broken out sooner or later even without the specific incident that set it off.**  If taken too far, however, this tendency eliminates the role of contingency in history and diminishes our ability to perceive the alternative pathways that were present to historical actors. The point is perhaps best made through a counterfactual about the Cold War. **During the** 1962 **Cuban Missile Crisis**, **a bizarre false warning** incident **in** the **U.S. radar systems** facing Cuba **led officers** at the North American Air Defense Command **to believe that** the U.S. was under attack and that **a nuclear weapon was about to go off in Florida.** Now **imagine** the counterfactual event that **this** false warning was reported and believed by U.S. leaders and **resulted in** a U.S. nuclear **"retaliation**" against the Russians. **How would future historians have seen the causes of World War III?** **One can easily imagine arguments stressing that the war between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable. War was overdetermined: given** the **deep** political **hostility o**f the two superpowers, the ***conflicting ideology***, the escalating arms race, **nuclear war would have occurred eventually**. I**f not during that specific crisis over Cuba, then over the next one in Berlin,** or the Middle East, or Korea. **From that perspective, focusing on this particular accidental event as a cause of war would be seen as misleading. Yet, we all now know, of course that a nuclear war was neither inevitable nor overdetermined during the Cold War.**

***( ) There’s always value to life –Prefer our ev because of Frankl’s subject position.***

Phyllis D. **Coontz,** PhD Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of Pittsburgh, et al, JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING, **2001**, 18(4), 235-246 – J-Stor

In the 1950s, **psychiatrist and theorist** Viktor **Frankl (**1963) **described an existential theory of** purpose and **meaning in life. Frankl, a long-time prisoner in a concentration camp, re- lated several instances of transcendent states that he experienced in the midst of that terri- ble suffering** using his own experiences and observations. He believed that **these experi- ences allowed him and others to maintain their sense of dignity and self-worth.** Frankl (1969) claimed that **transcendence occurs by giving to others, being open to others** and the environment, and coming to accept the reality that some situations are un- changeable. **He hypothesized that life always has meaning for the individual; a person can always decide how to face adversity**. Therefore, **self-transcendence provides mean- ing and enables the discovery of meaning for a person** (Frankl, 1963). Expanding Frankl's work, Reed (1991b) linked self-transcendence with mental health. Through a developmental process **individuals gain an increasing understanding of who they are and are able to move out beyond themselves despite the fact that they are ex- periencing** physical and mental **pain. This** expansion beyond the self **occurs through in- trospection**, concern about others and their well-being, and integration of the past and fu- ture **to strengthen one's present life** (Reed, 1991b).

***Ontology not first --- must stop in the face of mass death***

**Davidson ’89**(Arnold I. coeditor of Critical Inquiry, Assoc Prof of Philosophy, U of Chicago, Critical Inquiry, Winter . p.426)

I understand Levinas’ work to suggest another path to the recovery of the human, one that leads through or toward other human beings: “The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face… Hence metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted- in our relations with men… The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men… that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of.” Levinas places ethics before ontology by beginning with our experience of the human face: and, in a clear reference to Heidegger’s idolatry of the village life of peasants, he associated himself with Socrates, who preferred the city where he encountered men to the country with its trees. In his discussion of skepticism and the problem of others, Cavell also aligns himself with this path of thought, with the recovery of the finite human self through the acknowledgement of others: “As long as God exists, I am not alone. And couldn’t the other suffer the fate of God?… I wish to understand how the other now bears the weight of God, shows me that I am not alone in the universe. This requires understanding the philosophical problem of the other as the trace or scar of the departure of God [CR, p.470].” The suppression of the other, the human, in Heidegger’s thought accounts, I believe, for the absence, in his writing after the war, of the experience of horror. Horror is always directed toward the human; every object of horror bears the imprint of the human will. So Levinas can see in Heidegger’s silence about the gas chambers and death camps “a kind of consent to the horror.” And Cavell can characterize Nazis as “those who have lost the capacity for being horrified by what they do.” Where was Heidegger’s horror? How could he have failed to know what he had consented to? Hannah Arendt associates Heidegger with Paul Valery’s aphorism, “Les evenements ne sont que l’ecume des choses’ (‘Events are but the foam of things’).” I think one understands the source of her intuition. The mass extermination of human beings, however, does not produce foam, but dust and ashes; and it is here that questioning must stop.

***Extinction turns the alternative***

Reilly 8—26 year career in politics during which he founded the nation’s largest political consulting firm of its time. Reilly managed winning campaigns for a wide variety of high-profile candidates, including current Pelosi(Clint, “From Heidegger to the Environment: Californians Are in the World,” 19 August 2008, http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2008/08/from\_heidegger.html,)

Even in today’s age of cutting-edge science and technology, it is important to remember that history can still be shaped by big ideas. In the 18th century, a philosophy of knowledge emboldened the Founding Fathers to build our democracy – a system of government based on the meritocracy of ideas, rights of the individual and a free press. Capitalism itself is rooted in an innate belief in the power of individual initiative rather than the supremacy of group action – which inspired Marxism and Communism. Philosophy can be mind numbingly boring. But it can help us more clearly see the path to a better world. The mid-20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger had a favorite term, “Dasein,” which cannot be translated precisely into a single English word. The rough meaning is “being-in-the-world,” Heidegger’s description of human existence. Heidegger’s most important point was that it is impossible to separate a person from the earth. Without the “world,” a human being could not know, grow or even live. A person is like a tree planted in the earth; without the earth, the tree could not exist. But there is a second implication to Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” bumper sticker. To be in the world is also to be “in common with other beings.” Whether we like it or not, we live in a natural state of dependence upon one another. Put another way, it is impossible to accurately define existence without affirming our dependence not only upon the earth, but also upon our fellow human beings. Was the German philosopher, who lived through World War II without standing up to Nazism’s atrocities, a closet environmentalist and a globalist before his time? Why is this somewhat obvious definition of human existence important to our world today? Many theories of human progress are rooted in a moral imperative. The Christian practice of charity is premised on the religious conviction that we are all God’s children and equal members of the human family. Therefore we are obligated to donate, assist and help others in need. Christians are also challenged to respect nature as God’s creation. This implies that charity and environmentalism are a sacrifice rather than a reflection of our collective self-interest. The truth is exactly the opposite. Protecting the earth and uniting the planet is the only logical political agenda of Dasein. In Jeffrey Sachs’ 2008 book “Common Wealth,” he argues that “the defining challenge of the 21st century will be to face the reality that humanity shares a common fate on a crowded planet.” Sachs, director of Columbia University’s Earth Institute, cites four imperatives for world leaders to address: 1) Pressure on the earth’s ecosystems will produce climate change and species extinction. 2) Population growth will tax the earth. 3) The unequal distribution of wealth across the world is untenable. 4) Failed institutions impair vital global cooperation and problem solving. Last week, Russia invaded Georgia, sparking fears of a reconstituted cold war. The assault belied the presumption that the world was moving beyond nationalism. Fundamental conflicts between Islamic and Western cultures still dominate global politics. Despite a growing consensus on the need for international efforts to curb emissions and develop clean energy, the earth still reels from pollution. Poverty and sickness in sub-Saharan Africa contradict the image of a world that has conquered disease and hunger. And thousands of nuclear bombs still have the unthinkable power to destroy the earth and the entire human race. Those who thought that war and hunger would be easily conquered by science are slowly realizing that our toughest challenges are ahead. Perhaps we need to be reminded of Heidegger’s truth: **No “world,” no “being,”** no “we,” no “I.”

#### Can’t solve calc thought --- too entrenched

**Riis 11**—Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, Ph.D. from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Søren, 8 February 2011, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,”)

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, ‘‘nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely **simultaneously with the very origin of human beings**. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is **connected to being human**. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell.

***Abandoning management causes extinction***

**Soulé 95** – Natural Resources Professor, California (Michael and Gary Lease, Reinventing Nature?, p 159-60, AG)

The decision has already been made in most places. Some of the ecological myths discussed here contain, either explicitly or implicitly, the idea that nature is self-regulating and capable of caring for itself. This notion leads to the theory of management known as benign neglect—nature will do fine, thank you, if human beings just leave it alone. Indeed, a century ago, a hands-off policy was the best policy. Now it is not. Given nature's current fragmented and stressed condition, neglect will result in an accelerating spiral of deterioration. Once people create large gaps in forests, isolate and disturb habitats, pollute, overexploit, and introduce species from other continents, the viability of many ecosystems and native species is compromised, resiliency dissipates, and diversity can collapse. When artificial disturbance reaches a certain threshold, even small changes can produce large effects, and these will be compounded by climate change.' For example, a storm that would be considered normal and beneficial may, following widespread clearcutting, cause disastrous blow-downs, landslides, and erosion. If global warming occurs, tropical storms are predicted to have greater force than now. Homeostasis, balance, and Gaia are dangerous models when applied at the wrong spatial and temporal scales. Even fifty years ago, neglect might have been the best medicine, but that was a world with a lot more big, unhumanized, connected spaces, a world with one-third the number of people, and a world largely unaffected by chain saws, bulldozers, pesticides, and exotic, weedy species. The alternative to neglect is active caring—in today's parlance, an affirmative approach to wildlands: to maintain and restore them, to become stewards, accepting all the domineering baggage that word carries. Until humans are able to control their numbers and their technologies, **management is the only viable alternative** to massive attrition of living nature.

***Earth is so over-run with human control that relinquishing management now wouldn’t solve – it would be impossible for nature to take its course – only pragmatism solves***

**Katz ’99** (Eric, Science, Technology, and Society Program, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Winter, Environmental Ethics, Vol 21, “A Pragmatic Reconsideration of Anthropocentrism,” jj)

What about the nonanthropocentric argument regarding beach replenishment? A nonanthropocentric argument, by definition, will not consider as primary the benefits that humans will obtain from a particular policy—so many of the reasons just listed cannot be considered. **From a perspective of nonanthropocentric ecological holism, we should let natural processes take their course for the good of the overall ecological community**. **If the beach erodes, the erosion is part of the normal natural dynamics of the shoreline ecosystem. Indeed, most of the sand is not lost to the system; it simply shifts its location**, for undeveloped and unprotected barrier islands have a tendency to move landward over the course of time. Sand moves from the ocean side of the island to the bay side. The movement and displacement of sand would result in the loss of houses, especially along the immediate ocean waterfront, but this loss would not be a negative impact for the natural ecosystem. In addition, letting the natural erosion process continue without interference might lead to the possible reemergence or resurgence of those species that have been harmed by human housing development along the shore—such as the piping plover and the least and roseate terns. Thus, **a nonanthropocentric perspective would lead to a policy in which the shoreline would continue to erode as sands naturally shift.** The beach would be “restored” in a sense to a more natural state. On first examination, thus, there is a clear pragmatic difference between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism. One position favors a policy of beach replenishment and the other does not. However, **there is a major complication to this analysis** that I want to consider. **The idea that we can let nature take its course in this case is problematic.** On my view, **the beaches** of Fire Island **are now an artifactual system, considerably modified by human development**—particularly bulkheading and jetties. Except for the wilderness areas, almost the entire north side of Fire Island is bulkheaded, with docks and artificially dredged harbors and boat slips. Thus, **the natural movement of sand by water currents has been disrupted** for about a hundred years, and indeed part of the erosion problem is caused by the fact that the sand, when it migrates to the bay side of the island, has no place to land—the bulkheading acts like a seawall and prevents the accumulation of sand dropped by the smaller estuarine waves of the Great South Bay. Sand migrating over the island by wind, waves, and tidal surges is also prevented from a natural buildup by the humanmade physical structures and human activity. (One of the common early spring chores is to sweep the winter’s accumulation of sand off the main sidewalks. But the sand’s movement to the north is relentless—the sidewalks have to be swept weekly during the summer months.) **Given the current state of development on the island it would be impossible to let nature take its course**; the island no longer has a natural configuration. (Of course, there would be one radical way to solve this problem: the park service could condemn all the private homes on the island, destroy them, and rip out all human-made physical structures. The economic cost of this plan would be astronomical, both in outof- pocket expenses and in the lost revenue from tourism and real-estate taxes.) Thus, if the beach is an artifactual system, the question to be asked changes: What is the pragmatic difference between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism regarding the policy of beach replenishment for a nonnatural artifactual beach system? **The anthropocentric argument appears essentially to be the same as before. We still want to promote human interests by saving and preserving the beach— only now we recognize that it is not a natural beach, but an artifactual one**. We are still going to preserve the island for human benefits and human interests. We still want to protect the private homes and provide a recreational beach. We can even argue that the artifactual beach system is necessary to protect the relatively undisturbed wilderness area that lies on the landward side of the dunes. The anthropocentric argument thus does not change. However, **the nonanthropocentric ecological holistic argument is now largely irrelevant, for we are only dealing with an artifactual system**, or at best a hybrid of natural and artifactual. **Such a system is essentially human-based, so that human interests and concerns dominate any evaluation**. I have previously analyzed the difference between artifacts and natural entities—and I will not repeat arguments I have made in some detail in other places.23 I have argued that it is the presence of human intentionality in a natural system that irrevocably modifies nature and establishes an artifactual system. The introduction of human purpose is the key to understanding the difference between artifactual and natural systems. The reason why we create artifacts, why we interfere in natural processes, is to further human goals and interests. We tend to evaluate the worth of our artifacts and human-made systems by their success in achieving our human-centered aims. Thus, we will value the Fire Island system to the extent that it meets our aims and goals. **We cannot return** Fire Island **to a “natural” state**. **Thus, we cannot use what is beneficial to the overall ecological community as the sole guide to environmental decision-making. We must consider the satisfaction of human interests in the evaluation of** environmental **policies** on Fire Island. As an artifactual system—or as a hybrid of the natural and the artifactual—Fire Island must be evaluated from a perspective that includes anthropocentrism. Thus, Fire Island will have to be managed— perhaps preserved in terms of long-range sustainability—so that it best achieves the human goals that have been incorporated into its development. In this case, pragmatism as a methodology—as a means of testing theoretical ideas for their “cash-value” in terms of practical consequences—teaches us that a **simplistic reliance on theoretical concepts such as anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism will fail to address adequately the complexities of the policy situation.** Pragmatism endorses a vision beyond the facile dualisms of nonanthropocentrism and anthropocentrism, natural and artifactual. Without resorting to the substantive content of pragmatism as a moral philosophy, **we can see the need for flexibility, compromise, and a pluralism of values in the analysis of concrete environmental policy decisions. When dealing with a hybrid system of humanity and nature, we need to use all of the relevant theoretical concepts, crossing and recrossing the boundaries that separate anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism**. Pragmatism cannot, in the end, tell us how to effect the compromise; it cannot tell us what specific policies we should adopt in all situations. **Pragmatism** simply **reminds us to be open to a wide range of possibly relevant and meaningful values in the formation and justification of policy.**

***Turn - Waiting for a new ontology is a strategy that dooms us to nuclear omnicide and makes all the aff and neg impacts inevitable.***

**Santoni ‘85** (Ronald E., Philosophy Professor @ Denison, Nuclear War, ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-7)

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often-stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the arms race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be too permissive in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its annihilation. The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved will ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

***Their K is complicit in Heidegger’s Nazism---impact is extinction***

**Faye 09** (Emmanuel, associate professor at the University Paris – Ouest-Nanterre La Defense and an authority on Descartes, Translated by Michael B. Smith, professor emeritus of French and philosophy at Berry College, “HEIDEGGER: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy”, pg xxiii-xxv, jj)

**We have not yet grasped the full significance of the propagation of Nazism and Hitlerism in the domain of thought and ideas**---that mounting tidal wave that sweeps up minds, dominates them, possesses them, and eventually overcomes all resistance. **Against it, the military victory was but the winning of a first battle**---a vital one, to be sure, and a costly one for humanity, since it took a world war. **Today a different battle, more protracted and sinister, is unfolding: a contest in which the future of the human race is at stake**. It calls for a heightened awareness in all areas of thought, from philosophy to law and history. Whether we are considering the case of Heidegger, Schmitt, Junger (in many respects), or Nolte, these main propagators of Nazism in the life of letters have taken the time to refine their strategy of reconquest after the defeat of the armies of Hitler’s Reich**. By an interplay of the obfuscation of real causes, the dilution of responsibilities in a globalization of approaches, the disqualification of humanistic thought and universal values, the mythologizing of self in the figure of the “shepard of being**,” the “Christian Epimetheus,” the “anarch,” the theoretician of the “historical right,” **these authors have scripted the roles of philosophy, law, letters, and history, enlisting them in the service of** the “revision” and ultimately of the rehabilitation of foundations of **Nazism**. **Some have progressively conquered a planetary audience with a public that most often does not realize what is at stake, in the long run, in this conquest of minds**. It is true that the front lines of the invasion are not found on any map. There is no geopolitics of the mind, although **the increasing number of apologetic or too complacent works in an indication of the magnitude of its propagation**. Nevertheless, centers of criticism and resistance have sprung up progressively in many countries. For **Heidegger**, the subject of this work, very incisive criticisms have been raised, both in Europe and on the American continent, since Karl Lowith perceived and reported as early as 1947 that he **was “more radical than Mr. Kriech and Mr. Rosenberg,” two pillars of the Nazi regime, but who, being less adroit and more trivial, did not see their reputations survive the defeat of the Third Reich.** Furthermore, **new documents and deeper research allow us today to see to what extent Heidegger devoted himself to putting philosophy at the service of legitimizing and diffusing the very bases of Nazism and Hitlerism**. That is why I want to make available to the public some of the most significant moments of the seminars taught between 1933 and 1935, taken from the archives of Heidegger’s unpublished manuscripts. A few of **these texts**, known to only a handful of researchers, **are** in fact **political education courses at the service of Hitler’s state and go so far as to** identify the ontological difference between being and individual entities with the political relationship between the state and the people, while other texts **explicitly explore the means of perpetuating the “spirit” of Nazism**. In making these excerpts public, my intention has been simply to exercise the right to historical and philosophical truth. **I have** also **based my work on the speeches, lectures, and courses over these same years that have recently appeared in Germany and can be consulted only by readers of German. These texts,** published in volumes 16, 36/37, and 38 of the so-called complete works, **are every bit as racist and virulently National Socialist as those of the official “philosophers” of Nazism,** such as Alfred Baeumler or Hans Heyse. **They surpass the others by the virulence of their Hitlerism, which no other “philosopher” of the regime has equaled. Despite that, these Hitlerian and Nazi Texts of Heidegger are to be found on the philosophy shelves of public libraries. The seriousness of that situation calls for a new and heightened awareness.** Without ever dissociating philosophical reflection from indispensable historical investigation, I have tried to bring together the establishment and analysis of historical and textual sources, as the historians Hugo Ott and Bernd Martin (as well as Guido Schneeberger and Victor Farias), with the philosophical critique, which has been developed by a series of authors as varied as Ernst Cassirer, Benedetto Croce, Karl Lowith, Theodor Adorno, Gunther Anders, Hans Blumenberg, Jurgen Habermas, Ernst Tugendhat, Eric Weil, Rainer Marten, Nicolas Tertulian, Jeffrey Barash, Domenico Losurdo, Arno Munster, Richard Wolin, Tom Rockmore, Thomas Sheehan, Herman Philipse, Hassan Givsan, Reinhard Linde, and Julio Quesada, to mention but a few of the most important names. But this book proposes a new understanding of what Heidegger brought about. With the help of texts little known outside the German-speaking world, some not even published, and taking into account those individuals with whom he chose to surround himself---the “philosopher” Erich Rothacker, the historian Rudolf Stadelmann, and the legal scholar Erik Wolf---I intend to prove that **the question of the relationship between Heidegger and National Socialism is not that of the personal commitment of a man temporarily gone astray and a philosophical work that remains almost unaffected, but rather that of the deliberate introduction of the foundations of Nazism and Hitlerism into philosophy** and its teaching. In showing this, it is not my desire to add to Heidegger’s renown by making it even more diabolical. I do not subscribe to the theory of a Heidegger “thinker” of Nazism, because rather than enlightening us, he has done nothing but blend the characteristic opacity of his teaching with the darkness of the phenomenon. **Far from furthering the progress of thought, Heidegger has helped to conceal the deeply destructive nature of the Hitlerian undertaking** by exalting its “grandeur.” **Far from enriching philosophy, he has worked to destroy it, by making it subservient to a movement that, by the murderous discrimination underlying it and the project of collective annihilation to which it leads, constitutes the radical negation of all humanity and all thought.** After the paroxysm of the Nazi and Hitlerian period, long elaborated in Heidegger’s writings even before 1933, and after the toxic spite often characterizing his courses taught in 1933-1934, **the diffusion of Heidegger’s works after the war slowly descends like ashes after an explosion---a gray cloud slowly suffocating and extinguishing minds**. Soon **the** 102 **volumes** of the so-called complete work (sixty-six volumes have appeared to date), in which the same assertions are repeated over and over through thousands of pages, will encumber by their sheer bulk the shelves reserved for twentieth century philosophy and **continue to spread the fundamental tenets of Nazism on a world-wide scale**.

## Block

### Impact Overview

***Hegemony outweighs the aff:***

***First --- We are winning an over-arching global uniqueness claim that should frame your decision calculus --- statistics prove the world is becoming more peaceful due to US hegemony --- extend Mack --- US leadership advances democracy and globalization which dampens all conflict by making war not economical. This means there is an extremely low propensity for the aff’s impacts to escalate or even occur in the first place --- these trends are inclusive of both interstate warfare and structural violence --- only a risk voting aff makes the world worse***

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Moreover, a century has 100 years, not just 50, and **the second half of the twentieth century has astonished military historians with its unprecedented avoidance of wars between developed states and between great powers**. Civil wars did proliferate in the years after the two world wars, but **civil wars** tend to be less destructive than interstate wars, and they, too, **have declined in number and in death tolls.** There were far fewer deaths in war in the first decade of the twenty-first century than any of the five decades preceding it. **The obsolescence of major war is just one of many historical declines of violence.** **European homicide rates have dropped at least 30-fold** since the Middle Ages, from about 40 per 100,000 people per year in the fourteenth century to 1.3 at the end of the twentieth. **Barbaric customs that were unexceptional for millennia, such as human sacrifice, the persecution of witches and heretics, chattel slavery, blood sports, punitive torture and mutilation, sadistic executions** (burning, breaking, crucifixion, disembowelling, impalement) **and execution for victimless crimes have been abolished in most of the world**. **The past 50 years have seen a cascade of rights revolutions — civil, women's, children's, gay, animal — which have demonstrably driven down rates of lynching, pogroms, rape, spousal abuse, child abuse, spanking, gay-bashing, hunting and callousness to laboratory animals.**

***AND – the judge must evaluate the consequences of their advocacy – ignoring the implications allows infinite violence***

**Williams 2005** (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and **uncritical stances of abstract moralism** or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will**.** But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the **precondition for freedom**. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

***Turns case---war short-circuits the transition to new forms of politics***

**Linklater ’89** (Andrew-, Beyond Realism and Marxism, P. 32)

These theoretical disagreements with Marxism generate major differences at the practical level. It is necessary to conclude that a post-Marxist critical theory of international relations must concede that **technical and practical orientations to foreign policy are inescapable** at least at this juncture. Such an approach must appreciate the need for classical realist methods of protecting the state under conditions of insecurity and distrust, and recognise the importance of the rationalist defence of order and legitimacy in the context of anarchy. It is important to take account of the rationalist claim that **order is unlikely to survive if the major powers cannot reconcile their different national security interests**. In a similar vein, a critical approach to international relations is obliged to conclude that **the project of emancipation will not make significant progress if international order is in decline**. One of its principal tasks would then be to understand how the community of states can be expanded so that it approximates a condition which maximises the importance of freedom and universality. In this case, **a critical theory of international relations which recognises the strengths of realism and Marxism must aim for a political practice which deals concurrently with the problem of power, the need for order and the possibility of emancipation through the extension of human community**.

***Weakened America increases violent securitization --- even if they win heg bad, the alt’s worse***

**Brzezinski ’12** (Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, is author of the forthcoming book Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, Foreign Policy, After America

<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?page=0,1>, jj)

For **if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor** -- not even China. **International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and** even **outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes**. **While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system** -- for instance, another financial crisis -- **would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor**. **No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world,** upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, **expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order**. **More probable would be** a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of **international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue**. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. **Russia**, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, **will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union**. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. **Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth**. **None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role**. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that **China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power**. Accordingly, **Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.** At some stage, however, **a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise** and damage China's international interests. **A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself**. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. **The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors**. **A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue**. ***Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty.*** At the same time, **the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species**. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. **A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development.** The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. **Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability**. In almost every case, **the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.** None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But **those dreaming today of America's collapse would** probably **come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.**

#### Heg decreases structural violence---any alt dooms humanity to deprivation

Thomas P.M. Barnett 11, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, September 12, 2011, “The New Rules: The Rise of the Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory,” World Politics Review, online: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9973/the-new-rules-the-rise-of-the-rest-spells-u-s-strategic-victory

First the absurdity: A few of the most over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did indeed promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. **It was a nutty concept then**, and it **remains a nutty concept today**. But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ Meanwhile, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be. So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But **the "evil" of the Washington Consensus** only yielded the **most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen**. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, **and their record on economic development was painfully transparent**: **Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer**. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- **after millennia of mere sustenance**. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but the historical sequence is undeniable: **With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place**. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s after the Soviet threat disappeared. It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. **Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements**, including al-Qaida, but we made the effort because, in our heart of hearts, we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of the War on Terror is that its operational requirements actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But the end result is clear: **We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era**.¶ But, of course, **that can all be tossed into the dumpster** if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the **greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen,** but also the **greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen**. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China, whose growing strength upsets us so much, then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come. ¶ As always, **the choice is ours**.

#### The world getting better now because heg is peaceful

Busby 12 Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity **compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other [reports](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) based on Uppsala data is right**,** war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

### A2 heg bad

#### Heg isn’t coercive or imperialist – has broad support globally --- no impact to backlash

Singh, 08 (Sept, Robert, Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College, University of London; co-editor of The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism; co-author, with Timothy Lynch, of After Bush: The Case For Continuity in American Foreign Policy, International Politics: The Hague, Vol 45, Iss. 45, “The Exceptional Empire: Why the United States Will Not Decline – Again,” Proquest, ts)

Third, and despite Iraq, **America's extensive network of global alliances remains formidably impressive**. As Bradley Thayer observes, **'Far from there being a backlash against the United States, there is worldwide bandwagoning with it'** (Layne and Thayer, 2007, 106-107). **Of 192 nations in the world, Thayer identified only five as 'opposed' to America: China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Eighty-four states are US allies**, comprising most major economic and military powers, including 25 members of NATO, **14 major non-NATO allies, 19 Rio Pact members, seven Caribbean Regional Security System members, 13 members of the Iraq coalition not in the other categories, along with Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan and Tunisia. A ratio of 17 to 1** (84 to 5) **represents a rather positive outcome for the world's primary power**. The brute reality remains that **most countries wish to align with the US, actively do so, and benefit directly from its security guarantees, open markets and international trade**. Even -- especially -- in relation to rising powers such as China and India, **national interests typically point in the direction of either actively supporting or passively acquiescing in the American-led international system rather than challenging it**. Iraq was an aberration, not a norm, in this regard.

***They = reductionist.***

**Nye, February 2008**

Joseph S. Survival, “Recovering American Leadership”, http://www.informaworld.com/index/790435554.pdf

In light of these new circumstances, how will the only superpower guide its foreign policy after the experience of the Iraq war? Will it provide global leadership or conclude that the best course in world affairs is to remain uninvolved? Some Americans are tempted to believe that the United States could reduce its vulnerability if it withdrew its troops, curtailed its alliances and followed a more isolationist foreign policy. But isolationism would not remove the vulnerability. Even if Washington had a more inward-looking foreign policy, radical groups would resent the power of the American economy that would still reach well beyond its shores. American corporations and citizens represent global capitalism, which is anathema to some. Moreover, American popular culture has a global reach regardless of what the government does. There is no escaping the influence of Hollywood, CNN and the Internet. American films and television express freedom, individualism and change (as well as sex and violence). Generally, the global reach of American culture helps to enhance America’s soft power– individualism and liberties are attractive to many people. Some, however, are repulsed by these American values, particularly fundamentalists. Moreover, new problems like climate change and pandemics cross borders without the slightest regard to American culture or intentions. Turning inward does no good if the problems follow you home.

***US won’t do more mindless interventions***

Mandelbaum 11 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011) http://www.cfr.org/publication/23828/cfr\_90th\_anniversary\_series\_on\_renewing\_america.html?cid=rss-fullfeed-cfr\_90th\_anniversary\_series\_on-011811&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed:+cfr\_main+(CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed)

MANDELBAUM: I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

***Hegemony is anti-racist.***

**Bonnett, 2006** (Alastair, The Americanization of Anti-Racism? Global Power and Hegemony in Ethnic Equity, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 32, No. 7, September, pp. 1083-1103)

In summary, it is shown that US-Americanisation and neo-liberalism cannot be reduced to questions of either personal political ‘good will’ or direct US control. My analysis suggests two things: . **The US-Americanisation of anti-racism has occurred**, in part, **because the influence of the US appears not as a form of dominant authority but of counter-authority, a challenge to traditional hierarchies**. This is not the only, or even dominant, way the US-Americanisation of anti-racism has proceeded but **it** **does help explain why the impact of US global supremacy on debates on antiracism around the world has been hard to explain intellectually and politically**. . To understand US-Americanisation we must understand its relationship with transnational forces, notably neo-liberalism and the internationalisation of economic and social governance. These forces have a contingent and fraught relationship, which creates room for anomalies and contradictions. The situation is further complicated by virtue of the fact that ‘the USA’ is being employed and deployed as a model of modernisation in ways that are beyond its control. Thus, for example, US-Americanisation and neo-liberal globalisation can be intertwined through the agency of a semi-autonomous institution (such as the World Bank) at the same moment that the national politics of the USA are becoming more insular (and less neo-liberal).**These themes are approached mainly theoretically but also empirically**. In order to exemplify them I have drawn on a number of specific, if unsystematic, illustrations from one of the principle institutions within the contemporary ‘world order’, the World Bank (more specifically, its work in Latin America). My choice of the World Bank to explore these themes reflects, in part, its considerable importance in promoting social, political and economic ideologies of ‘development’ and ‘progress’ around the world. The World Bank is the leading player within the ‘development community’, in whose wake many other agencies follow. For my purposes, **the World Bank** is also of interest because its activities and organisation **have been shaped** in some part **by US-American global power**, yet it is not an organ of the US state. **The World Bank disseminates** a model of **social change** that does not require US consent or involvement\*it may, indeed, be at variance with US government priorities at any one time\*yet it reflects a vision that melds US-Americanisation and neo-liberalisation. To a degree that has not yet become so explicit in other world regions, **the World Bank’s vision for Latin America has recently been marked by a concern for the ‘social inclusion’ of ethnic minorities within the market economy**. To this end the Bank interprets and categorises a number of Latin American societies through the lens of ‘race relations’, whilst approaching racial and ethnic identities as forms of capital which racist ‘traditions’ conspire to waste. Global Power in the Twenty-First Century ‘[T]he principal aspect of the past decade’, noted Anderson in 2000, is the ‘consolidation, and universal diffusion of neo-liberalism’ (2000: 10). **It may be assumed that, if neo-liberal globalisation has a dominant cultural form and political ‘national base’, it may be found within the USA, the country which**, in Thomas Friedman’s (2000: 367) terms, **is the cosmopolitan, multicultural, democratic and, hence, ‘benign hegemon and reluctant enforcer’ of the world order.** Yet the term ‘Americanizationglobalization’, given to us by Thomas Friedman (2000), which implies an intermeshing of the world’s ‘lead society’ and the world’s ‘lead ideology’, is somewhat simplistic. It may be true that, for many people around the world, ‘Globalisation . . . is conceived as Americanisation’ (Xia 2003: 709). Yet it is a conflation that flies in the face of a powerful tendency amongst scholars of global change to emphasise the increasing diversity of cultural formation. Indeed, Ritzer and Stillman (2003: 37) go so far as to announce that ‘globalisation theory tends to subscribe to an increasingly pluralistic view of the world’. This is an overstatement but it is true that **an interest, not in the homogenisation, but in the increasing complexity of patterns of cultural exchange, marks a range of contemporary interventions in the field**. **Thus, the political landscape is depicted in terms of ‘entanglement’** (Radcliffe et al. 2002), ‘**glocalisation**’ (Robertson 1995), **as a field of ‘many globalisations**’ (Berger and Huntingdon 2003), or as witnessing ‘globalisation from above’ meeting ‘globalisation from below’ (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Ritzer suggests that **There is a gulf between those who emphasize the increasing grobal [globally growing] influence of capitalistic, Americanized, and McDonaldized interests and those who see the world growing increasingly pluralistic and indeterminate**. At the risk of being reductive, this divide amounts to a difference in vision between those who see a world that is becoming increasingly grobalized\*more capitalistic, Americanized, rationalized, codified, and restricted\*and those who view it as growing increasingly glocalized\*more diverse, effervescent and free (2004: 79 80). Ritzer touches here upon the optimism that seems to encourage the alignment of globalisation with localisation. However, perceptions of the relationship between globalisation and the exercise of global power can shift rapidly. In 2005, Golub (2005: 1) announced that globalisation ‘appears exhausted’. The emergence of a more aggressive US foreign policy since the events of 11 September 2001, has placed a question mark over optimistic affirmations of the power of marginalised groups to ‘engage’ or ‘resist’ transnational capitalism and ‘US interests’. The international politics of the first few years of the twenty-first century is making the consideration, not simply of ‘diversity’ and ‘entanglements’, but of the exercise of dominance increasingly unavoidable. This imperative is itself liable to change. Harris (2005) has recently aired the possibility of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ that could, perhaps, challenge the ‘Washington Consensus’ and produce a ‘Third World’-based cultural and economic template for globalisation. Yet, for Harris, this is a forecast of a (hoped for) possibility, something that may one day happen. Speculation aside, what confronts us today is something of a crisis within narratives of pluralisation. The empire is back. Of course, within much left-wing analysis it never went away. The resurgent anti-imperialist focus on the political will and agency of US ‘superimperialism’ (Hudson 2003) is giving a new lease of life to neo-Marxist-Leninist explications of the ‘crises’ of capitalism. Yet, as important as these formulations sometimes are\*both to those freshly attuned to the idea that they are living in a era of empire, as well as to radicals who have never stopped describing the world in such terms\*they rely, as Hardt and Negri (2000) have explained, on an out-dated conception of ‘big nations’ as the central actors and centres of global power. Although what the USA does is of vital concern to everyone on the planet, the consequences of its influence, and the way the USA is employed and deployed as a symbol of modernity, have become increasingly transnational. The absorption and dissemination of neo-liberal ‘common-sense’ is a case in point: this social and economic model may draw on the prestige of the USA but it is not reducible to US agency. This also helps explain how we may find that, at one and the same time, **the world’s global institutions are disseminating a neo-liberal and ‘Americanised’ version of ‘ethnic equity’ policies**, whilst in the USA itself more socially conservative forces are at work\*neo-conservatism, for example. In sum, what is required is not another attempt to track US imperial intent but, rather, an engagement with the international deployment of the US as a social and economic role model. The terrain we enter, then, is one of paradoxes. **Those forms of racialised minority agency and resistance that have provoked anti-racist initiatives in so many countries, do so within and against an overarching (if always vulnerable) global system that is simultaneously ‘US-Americanising’ and truly international. Moreover, whilst the institutions within this system provide space for the voices of the marginalised, they also shape, interpret and give economic sanction to the ‘voices that are heard’ within non-dominant social movements and ideologies.**

***American culture destroys hierarchy and privilege***

-Zero risk of a link turn because critiques of X won’t change US foreign policy –US fights inequality abroad---those opposed to it are hypocritical, -American influence destroys hierarchy and privilege---that’s why repressive and patriarchal leaders around the world oppose our policies---areas where American influence thrives are more equal –their authors are biased; they start from the assumption America is evil and make the facts fit where they must---their ev is just empty jargon

**Hanson ’03** (Victor, Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Hanson was a National Endowment for the Humanities fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California (1992–93), a visiting professor of classics at Stanford University (1991–92), and alumnus of the year of the University of California, Santa Cruz (2002). In 1991 he was awarded an American Philological Association Excellence in Teaching Award, which is given yearly to the country's top undergraduate teachers of Greek and Latin. He received the Eric Breindel Award for Excellence in Opinion Journalism (2002), the National Humanities Medal (2007), and the Bradley Prize (2008). Hanson is the author of some 170 articles, book reviews, and newspaper editorials on Greek, agrarian, and military history and essays on contemporary culture. He has written or edited twenty books, including Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern (2010); Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome (ed.) (2010); Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (1983; paperback ed., University of California Press, 1998); Carnage and Culture (Doubleday, 2001); A War Like No Other (Random House 2005); The Western Way of War (Alfred Knopf, 1989; 2d paperback ed., University of California Press, 2000); The Wars of the Ancient Greeks (Cassell, 1999; paperback ed., 2001); and Mexifornia: A State of Becoming (Encounter, 2003). Hanson has written essays, editorials, and reviews for the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the International Herald Tribune, the New York Post, National Review, American Heritage, Policy Review, Commentary, National Review, the Wilson Quarterly, the Weekly Standard, Daily Telegraph, and Washington Times. He has been interviewed often on National Public Radio, the PBS Newshour, and C-Span BookTV. Currently, he is a syndicated columnist for Tribune Media Services and a weekly columnist for the National Review Online and Pajamas Media. Hanson received a BA at the University of California, Santa Cruz (1975) and his PhD in classics from Stanford University (1980), “What Empire?”, “The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire” pg. 154-155, jj)

**Critiques of the United States based on class, race, nationality;** or taste **have all failed to explicate**, **much less stop, the American cultural monstrosity**. **With African Americans** Condoleezza **Rice and** Colin **Powell steering U.S. foreign policy the United States promises $15 billion in AIDS assistance for Africa —only to have Nelson Mandela condemn America two days later**. **Forecasts of bankrupting defense expenditures and imperial overstretch are the stuff of the faculty lounge**; billions may be spent abroad, but the economy is now measured in trillions. **Neither Freud nor Marx is of much help in explaining the popular spread of American influence since our culture tends to destroy hierarchy and privilege---if we can gauge correctly the angst of imams and patriarchs in the Islamic world, traditionalists in Europe, and communist grandees from China to Cuba**. And real knowledge of past empires that might allow judicious analogies is beyond the grasp of **popular critics**, who instead **deductively start with the a priori assumption we are Rome and then make “facts” fit where they must. Add that all up, and our exasperated critics are left with little apart from empty jargon of legions and gunboats.**

**Realism 2nc**

***Hierarchies and the us-them mentality are inevitable***

**Wilkinson 5** (Will Wilkingson, policy analyst for the Cato Institute, “Capitalism and Human Nature” http://www.cato.org/research/articles/wilkinson-050201.html

**Our disposition to think in terms of "us" versus "them" is irremediable and it has unavoidable political implications**. Populist and racialist political rhetoric encourages people to identify themselves as primarily rich or poor, black or white. It is important to avoid designing institutions, such as racial preference programs, that reinforce coalitional categories that have no basis in biology and may heighten some of the tensions they are meant to relax. A great deal of the animosity toward free trade, to take a different example, depends on economically and morally inappropriate coalitional distinctions between workers in Baltimore (us) and workers in Bangalore (them). Positively, free trade is laudable for the way it encourages us to see to members of unfamiliar groups as partners, not enemies.

We are Hierarchical

**Like many** animals and **all primates, humans form hierarchies of dominance. It is easy to recognize social hierarchies** in modern life. **Corporations, government**, **chess clubs, and churches all have formal hierarchical structures** of officers. **Informal structures of dominance and status may be the leading cause of tears in junior high students.**

The dynamics of dominance hierarchies in the EEA was complex. **Hierarchies play an important role in guiding collective efforts** and distributing scarce resources without having to resort to violence. Daily affairs run more smoothly if everyone knows what is expected of him. However, **space at the top of the hierarchy is scarce and a source of conflict and competition.** **Those who command higher status in social hierarchies have better access to material resources and mating opportunities. Thus, evolution favors the psychology** of males and females who are able successfully to compete for positions of dominance.

Living at the bottom of the dominance heap is a raw deal, and we are not built to take it lying down. There is evidence that lower status males naturally form coalitions to check the power of more dominant males and to achieve relatively egalitarian distribution of resources. In his book Hierarchy in the Forest, anthropologist Christopher Boehm calls these coalitions against the powerful "reverse dominance hierarchies."

Emory professor of economics and law Paul Rubin usefully **distinguishes between "productive" and "allocative" hierarchies. Productive hierarchies are those that organize cooperative efforts to achieve otherwise unattainable mutually advantageous gains. Business organizations are a prime example. Allocative hierarchies, on the other hand, exist mainly to transfer resources to the top. Aristocracies and** dictatorships are extreme examples. Although the nation-state can perform productive functions, there is the constant risk that it becomes dominated by allocative hierarchies. Rubin warns that our natural wariness of zero-sum allocative hierarchies, which helps us to guard against the concentration of power in too few hands, is often directed at modern positive-sum productive hierarchies, like corporations, thereby threatening the viability of enterprises that tend to make everyone better off.

**There is no way to stop dominance-seeking behavior. We may hope only to channel it to non-harmful uses. A free society therefore requires that positions of dominance and status be widely available** in a multitude of productive hierarchies, and that opportunities for greater status and dominance through predation are limited by the constant vigilance of "the people"—the ultimate reverse dominance hierarchy. A flourishing civil society permits almost everyone to be the leader of something, whether the local Star Trek fan club or the city council, thereby somewhat satisfying the human taste for hierarchical status, but to no one's serious detriment.

**Threats Real 2nc**

***You should assume our threats are real – threat construction arguments make sense in theory but not practice – empirical reality validates the problems we describe – we have to maintain a sense of urgency so that we can deal with global problems – that’s Liotta***

***Our threats are not constructed and you should err toward caution—no self fulfilling prophecy***

**Schweller 4** [Randall, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

**Schmitt 2nc**

***Your K creates ideological blinders on real violence – this makes conflict and violence inevitable – terror is not constructed***

Charles **Krauthammer** (Pulitzer prize winning columnist for the Washington Post) July 2, 20**10** “ The Cowardice Of Not Calling Them Enemies”http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article/539272/201007021859/The-Cowardice-Of-Not-Calling-Them-Enemies.aspx

Instead, President Obama’s National Security Strategy insists on calling the enemy — **how else do you define those seeking your destruction**? — “a loose network of violent extremists.” But this is utterly meaningless. **This is not an anger-management therapy group gone rogue. These are people professing a powerful ideology rooted in a radical interpretation of Islam, in whose name they propagandize, proselytize, terrorize and kill. Why is this important?** Because **the first rule of war is to know your enemy. If you don’t, you wander into intellectual cul-de-sacs and ignore the real causes that might allow you to prevent recurrences**.

### Ontology

#### Prior focus on ontology causes paralysis and is de-historicizing

Kratochwil, professor of international relations – European University Institute, ‘8

(Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

The lesson seems clear. Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference (pointing to some property of the object under study), in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR, therefore, does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, I will sketch out the reasons for which a prag- matic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are – without a claim to completeness – intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas.

Firstly, a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology), but with “acting” (prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, **as historical beings placed in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information.** Pre- cisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions, and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail, rather than to generality, matter. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic.

These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and use- fulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position.

Secondly, since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” some- one, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.**Ontology doesn’t come first—human existence is a prerequisite for being**

**Zimmerman, professor of philosophy @ Tulane, 1994** (Michael, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, p. 109, Kel)

Unlike animals, humans can encounter as *entities* because humans can apprehend the “ontological difference” between being and entities. “Being” does not name a superentity, a metaphysical ground, a primal source, or a divine creator. Radically other than any entity, being names the event of presencing (*Anwesen*) by which an entity presents, reveals, or shows itself. Human existence constitutes the temporal, historical, lingusitc clearing, or absencing (*Abwesen)* in which the being (presencing, self-manifesting) of entities can occur. Without human existence, things could not be manifest and in this sense could not “be” at all.

#### Our impacts come first – existence is a prerequisite to ontology

**Storl, Professor of Philosophy at Augustana College, ‘8** (Heidi, October, “Heidegger in Woolf’s Clothing” Philosophy and Literature, Vol 32 No 2, p 303-314, Project Muse)

While the strength and pervasiveness of "how one finds oneself" cannot be over-estimated, **the being of the human being can be extinguished** [End Page 310] **only by death**. **As long as human activity occurs** (even when dull and dim), **being is, and disclosing and projecting remain as possibilities**. It is here that Heidegger offers a way out of our modern predicament and the ever-deepening normative void. The door slams. We "come to," gasp, encounter. **Though nothingness is everywhere and nowhere**, has swallowed up the anchors of our daily existence, **and has left scarcely any trace of body and mind—our embodied and embedded being—we do grasp something and in so doing, we care**. "If Da-sein explicitly discovers the world and brings it near, if it discloses its authentic being itself, this discovering of 'world' and disclosing of Da-sein always comes about by clearing away coverings and obscurities, by breaking up the disguises with which Da-sein cuts itself off from itself " (p. 121). According to Heidegger, Dasein ultimately is driven to discover and disclose its embodied and embedded being due to some form of uncanniness. It is this which "fetches Da-sein out of its entangled absorption in the 'world'" (p. 176). **Everyday familiarity collapses. The door slams, and we arrive. And, even if for just a moment, we care.**

### Management

#### Abandoning management is worse for the environment and a fantasy

Zizek ‘8, (Slavoj, Institute for Social Sciences Ljubljana, Censorship Today: Violence, or Ecology as a New Opium for the Masses Part 2, http://www.lacan.com/zizecology2.htm)

The lesson to be fully endorsed is thus that of another environmental scientist who came to the result that, while one cannot be sure what the ultimate result of humanity's interventions into geo-sphere will be, one thing is sure: if humanity were to stop abruptly its immense industrial activity and let nature on Earth take its balanced course, the result would have been a total breakdown, an imaginable catastrophe. "Nature" on Earth is already to such an extent "adapted" to human interventions, the human "pollutions" are already to such an extent included into the shaky and fragile balance of the "natural" reproduction on Earth, that its cessation would cause a catastrophic imbalance. This is what it means that humanity has nowhere to retreat: not only "there is no big Other" (self-contained symbolic order as the ultimate guarantee of Meaning); there is also no Nature qua balanced order of self-reproduction whose homeostasis is disturbed, thrown off the rails, by the imbalanced human interventions. Indeed, what we need is ecology without nature: the ultimate obstacle to protecting nature is the very notion of nature we rely on. Alan Weisman's The World Without Us is a vision of what would have happened if humanity (and ONLY humanity) were suddenly to disappear from the earth - natural diversity blooming again, nature gradually regaining human artefacts. We, humans, are reduced to a pure disembodied gaze observing our own absence. (As Lacan pointed out, this is the fundamental subjective position of fantasy: to be reduced to a, the gaze which observes the world in the condition of the subject's non-existence - like the fantasy of witnessing the act of one's own conception, the parental copulation, or the act of witnessing one's own burial, like Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn. A jealous child likes to indulge in the fantasy of imagining how his parents would react to his own death, putting at stake his own absence.) "The world without us" is thus fantasy at its purest: witnessing the Earth itself retaining its pre-castrated state of innocence, before we humans spoiled it with our hubris. The irony is that the most prominent example comes from the catastrophe of Chernobyl: the exuberant nature taking over the disintegrating debris of the nearby city Pripyat which was abandoned, left the way it was.

#### Technology is key to the environment

Anderson 96 – political scientist, social psychologist, and author of numerous non-fiction books. President Emeritus of the World Academy of Art and Science; a founding Fellow of the Meridian Intl Institute; a Fellow of the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute; and a Distinguished Consulting Faculty member of Saybrook U. (Walter, There's no going back to nature, Sept/Oct 96 Issue, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1996/09/theres-no-going-back-nature)

Projects such as this inspire enthusiasm from most people -- but are scornfully dismissed as "technological fixes" by back-to-nature true believers.¶ The term technological fix deserves some attention here, since it's one of the staples of ecotopian rhetoric, along with the promiscuous overuse -- to the point of meaninglessness -- of the word "natural." The argument against simply fixing up something with a technological repair job may well apply in some specific cases -- if, for example, a person is presented with the choice between having a quadruple bypass and adopting a healthy lifestyle -- but it really doesn't have much relevance to most current environmental concerns. The world is not faced with a simple choice of either adopting more environmentally sensitive attitudes or applying new technologies. Rather, we are seeing both a rapid evolution of technology away from heavy industrialism and value shifts about the environment.¶ Most of the other back-to-nature terms are similarly pumped-up and carelessly repeated concepts that have a certain amount of reasonableness if taken in moderation. That great favorite, "anthropocentrism," for example. This isn't just a challenge to the habit of valuing plants and animals only for their usefulness to humans -- which is something that needs challenging. The self-described "deep ecologists" are not interested in any such sensible objective. They escalate the rhetoric and prescribe that human beings learn how to live in equality with all other living things. However charming this might sound, it has utterly nothing to do with a world that is about to have 6 billion people in it, whether we like it or not.¶ Bioregionalism, too, is a useful idea in some contexts -- such as governance of air basins. But it becomes pure nonsense when people begin to advocate it -- as Kirkpatrick Sale does in his book Dwellers in the Land -- as a solution to be imposed on the whole world, by relocating people from the cities to rural areas where they would then take up ecologically correct lifestyles. There are indeed people who remain in one place, don't get hooked into the global economy, and rarely travel -- all parts of the bioregional answer -- and that's a perfectly fine way to live. The trouble is in turning it into a universal mandate and a political agenda -- a crusade to get everybody living that way. Not everybody does, not everybody wants to, and not everybody can.¶ Even the people who talk bioregionalism don't live that way -- and don't seem to notice the gap between what they say and how they live. Some years back, Sierra magazine ran an interview with poet Gary Snyder, in which he advised all of us: "Quit moving. Stay where you are...become a paysan, paisano, peón." He then proceeded directly, with no evident sense of irony, to telling of his recent trips to China and Alaska. A bit further on he added: "I've been traveling eight or 10 weeks a year, doing lectures and readings at universities and community centers around the United States. I'm able to keep a sense of what's going on in the country that way."¶ I don't think this makes Snyder a hypocrite. I think he's a perfectly honest guy who would rather recycle green platitudes for admiring listeners than think hard about what it really means to live in a global civilization.¶ Probably the most serious weakness of pop ecophilosophy is its Luddite tilt. Technology isn't just a thing -- it is human thought, action, information, and invention, and a living part of who and what we are. Some applications of technology are lousy and some are wonderful. But simply taking sides for or against technology is the lowest common denominator of public discourse.¶ Some technologies are and will always be central to environmental protection. I doubt that most people realize how important information technologies are in environmental management today.¶ We worry about the hole in the ozone layer -- and we should worry about it -- but don't appreciate the exquisite technology involved in detecting it, monitoring its ebbs and flows, projecting its future. Nobody sees a hole in the ozone. Like many other major environmental issues, it is accessible to our understanding only through the use of monitoring technologies.

#### Tech thought isn’t inherently bad – all the impacts in the 2nc prove it can be used for good things

Hughes 2006(James, Ph.D., Public Policy Studies at Trinity College, “Democratic Transhumanism 2.0,” Last Mod Jan 26, <http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm>)

First, left Luddism inappropriately equates technologies with the power relations around those technologies. Technologies do not determine power relations, they merely create new terrains for organizing and struggle. Most new technologies open up new possibilities for both expanded liberty and equality, just as they open new opportunities for oppression and exploitation. Since the technologies will most likely not be stopped, democrats need to engage with them, articulate policies that maximize social benefits from the technologies, and find liberatory uses for the technologies. If biotechnology is to be rejected simply because it is a product of capitalism, adopted in class society, then every technology must be rejected. The mission of the Left is to assert democratic control and priorities over the development and implementation of technology. But establishing democratic control over technological innovation is not the same as Luddism. In fact, to the extent that advocates for the democratic control of technology do not guarantee benefits from technology, and attempt to suppress technology altogether, they will lose public support.

#### Technological thought is reflexive and can be re-appropriated towards positive ends

Andrew Feenberg, Chair of Philosophy and Technology at SFU. 1996. “From Essentialism to Constructivism: Philosophy of Technology at the Crossroads” <http://www.agora.qc.ca/textes/feenberg.html>

The idea of a "concrete technology," which includes human beings and nature in its very structure, contradicts the commonplace notion that technique "conquers" its objects. In Simondon's theory the most advanced forms of progress consist in the creation of complex synergies of technical and natural forces through advances that incorporate the wider contexts of human and environmental needs into the structure of technical systems. While there is no strictly technological imperative dictating such an approach, strategies of concretization could embrace these contexts as they do others in the course of technical development. Where these contexts include environmental considerations, the technology emerges as reintegrated or adapted to nature; where they include the capacities of the human operators, the technology progresses beyond deskilling to become the basis for vocational self-development and participatory management. Demands for environmentally sound technology, and humane, democratic and safe work, are thus not extrinsic to the logic of technology, but respond to the reflexive tendency of technical development to construct synergistic totalities of natural, human, and technical elements. These considerations allow us to identify a type of directional development that is both technically and normatively progressive. The normative standards of that development are immanently derived from the resistances evoked by the technical process itself. That connection is clear where technical advance suppresses contextual features of nature and social life that the individuals mobilize to defend or to incorporate into improved designs through secondary instrumentalizations. The theory of concretization offers a better account of the bias of technology than that proposed by substantivism. This bias is not determined once and for all by the essentialized primary instrumentalization as in Heidegger and Habermas, but also has a complex social dimension. To be sure, technology may enframe and colonize; but it may also liberate repressed potentialities of the lifeworld that would otherwise have remained submerged. It is thus essentially ambivalent, available for very different types of development (21). The evidence of this is all around us. It has taken a certain theoretical obstinacy to ignore that evidence and to abstract from the emancipatory implications of technology in construing its essence. That obstinacy nevertheless had its justification as a reaction against the dystopian politics of technology of the postwar period. As technological issues are increasingly contested today, the dystopian risk fades. It is no longer sufficient to challenge the "one-dimensionality" of "technological thinking;" what is needed is an account of technology's ambivalence as a locus of social change.

# Round 4 Neg V Puget Sound/ASU Hybrid

## 1NC

**T – Production Not Transmission**

***Energy production is the generation of power from raw materials – it excludes distribution or conversion***

**Vaekstfonden 6** Vaekstfonden is a Danish government backed investment fund that facilitates the supply of venture capital in terms of start-up equity and high-risk loans "THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN DENMARK- perspectives on entrepreneurship and venture capital" No Specific Cited, Latest Data From 2006 s3.amazonaws.com/zanran\_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf

In all, **20 industry experts were interviewed** about the composition and dynamics of the Danish energy sector. Insights from a minimum of 3 industry experts have been assigned to each of the stages in the value chain. Following is a brief description of what the different stages encompass. Raw material extraction This stage encompass the process before the actual production of the energy. As an example it is increasingly expensive to locate and extract oil from the North Sea. Likewise coal, gas and waste suitable for energy production can be costly to provide. Energy production **Energy production encompasses the process, where energy sources are transformed into heat and power.** Transmission and distribution **Energy transmission and distribution is in this report defined as the infrastructure that enables the producers of energy to sell energy to consumers**. Consumption The last stage in the value chain is consumption. This stage encompasses products and services that geographically are placed near the consumers. As an example, decentralized energy production via solar power systems is part of the consumption stage.

***Violation: they don’t increase generation of nuclear power --- they incentivize fuel recycling***

***Vote neg:***

***Limits---including transmission doubles the size of the topic and makes it bidirectional by allowing affs to affect both supply and demand sides of each energy---undermines preparedness for all debates---err neg because the terms incentives and restrictions serve no limiting function***

***Ground---all disads are based on increasing the actual amount of power available---they allow the aff to just distribute energy without increasing production***

**DA 1**

***US won’t cave to South Korea on reprocessing now***

**Yonhap**, 3-8-**2012**, “U.S. unlikely to allow S. Korea to reprocess nuclear fuel,” http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/03/08/23/0301000000AEN20120308007100315F.HTML

**The U**nited **S**tates **is unlikely to allow South Korea to adopt** its indigenous technology aimed at **reprocessing** highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel in their negotiations to revise a bilateral nuclear accord, a senior Seoul diplomat involved in the talks said Thursday. The **refusal** by U.S. negotiators **stemmed from a "*deep-rooted distrust*" of South Korea**, which had once authorized a clandestine nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s under former president Park Jung-hee but shut it down under pressure from Washington, the diplomat said on the condition of anonymity. **Rather than pressing the U.S. to allow** South Korea to adopt the proliferation-resistant reprocessing technology, called "**pyroprocessing**," **Seoul is focusing on revising** the nuclear accord to make it easier **to export nuclear power** plants, the diplomat said.

***Failure to maintain a hardline on domestic reprocessing shatters the norm against ENR and makes credible US diplomatic pressure impossible – ensures South Korean ENR***

Scott **Sagan**, poly sci prof @ Stanford, co-chair Global Nuclear Future Initiative, 4-18-20**11**, “The International Security Implications of U.S. Domestic Nuclear Power Decisions,” http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120621005012/http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/sagan\_brc\_paper\_final.pdf

A similar phenomenon occurs when **policy makers** and scholars **underestimate the international effect of the U.S. decision to abandon** plutonium **reprocessing** in the 1970s. Skeptics claim that the fact that France and Japan, especially, went forward with their ambitious plutonium reprocessing efforts somehow demonstrates that U.S. efforts to constrain the global growth were a failure. But a more appropriate standard (but again more difficult to measure) for assessing our influence would estimate the number of states that would have developed plutonium reprocessing capabilities if the U.S. had not actively discouraged such fuel cycle activities after Jimmy Carter’s April 1997 order to cancel construction of commercial breeder reactors that employed a closed fuel cycle with plutonium reprocessing. **The primary motivation behind the decision to postpone** the development of this technology **was** a concern for the **prolif**eration implications of the U.S. use of a closed fuel cycle. 17 The Carter administration reasoned that **the decision to end reprocessing in the U.S. would have two effects**: first, **the U.S. could no longer act as an exporter** of related technologies, **limiting** their **availability**; and second, **it would create a *normative change* that would redefine the behavior of a responsible nuclear power state.** Because we are estimating a counterfactual condition, it is not possible to measure definitively the effects of the Carter policy on the actual spread of reprocessing facilities around the world. Of the twenty-one countries that at some point in their history pursued plutonium reprocessing, ten have finished large-scale facilities and use them today: U.S., China, Israel, France, UK, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and North Korea. 18 Algeria and the Czech Republic have a pilot-scale reprocessing plants, but have not moved towards further industrial development. 19 Nine countries abandoned their reprocessing programs: South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. 20 The causes of these reversal decisions were complex, but in many of the cases **U.S. *diplomatic pressure* was an important factor and** that pressure was ***made more credible* and acceptable because the U.S had *given up* its own** civilian plutonium **reprocessing** programs. **This “credibility” factor continues to be important** today. **South Korea is lobbying to renegotiate** its agreements with the U.S. to be able to develop “pyro-processing,” a form of spent fuel **reprocessing** that supporters claim poses fewer proliferation risks than standard PUREX acqueous reprocessing. While this appears a challenge to the claim that the U.S. policy has had a positive influence, **the very fact that the South Koreans are actively arguing** that pyro-processing – unlike the PUREX process – does not separate out plutonium **shows** their **awareness of the *power of the norm* against developing such tech**nologies. While the U.S. government initially cooperated with South Korea on pyroprocessing research, Richard Stratford (Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs in the Bureau of Nonproliferation, U. S. Department of State) recently stated that the technology “moved to the point that the product is dangerous from a proliferation point of view,” and that the DOE now “states frankly and positively that pyro-processing is reprocessing.” **The U.S. government position against pyro-processing in South Korea** today **is *made more credible* by the fact that the U.S. does not reprocess** spend fuel for commercial purposes. 21

***South Korean ENR causes South Korean prolif and undermines US nonprolif efforts with Iran, North Korea, and Southeast Asia***

Zachary **Keck 12,** Assistant Editor of The Diplomat, “Rough Waters? The State of the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” The Diplomat, 8-22-12, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/08/22/rough-waters-the-state-of-the-rok-u-s-alliance/

Washington’s **concerns over South Korean’s nuclear ambitions have only been heightened by Seoul’s latest campaign to acquire indigenous enrichment and reprocessing facilities**, which it is proscribed from doing under a nuclear pact it signed with Washington in 1974. In contrast, the U.S. has signed agreements recognizing Japan’s reprocessing and enrichment rights as well as India’s de facto reprocessing capability. Now**, with the U.S. and South Korea renegotiating the** 1974 nucle**ar pact that will expire in 2014, South Korea has demanded that Washington acquiesce to Seoul building enrichment and processing facilities.** South Korea’s immediate interest in acquiring these capabilities is not nuclear weapons but rather further expanding its nuclear energy industry at home and abroad. Nonetheless, **the U.S. has rejected South Korea’s request thus far**, with President Obama’s top proliferation adviser, Garry Samore, telling South Korean reporters last month, “There is no danger that Korean industry will not be able to get access to low enriched uranium," **Washington has a number of reasons to oppose South Korea’s request**, many of which have nothing to do with Seoul. For instance, **a key component of** President **Obama’s nuclear security agenda is the goal of securing all nuclear materials worldwide within four years. Allowing South Korea to begin producing its own fissile materials would run counter to this goal and undercut the administration’s important successes in reducing the number of countries that possess and produce these materials.** **Allowing South Korea to build these facilities would also *undermine the current U.S.-led campaign to persuade Iran to abandon its own enrichment facilities*. It would** also **adversely affect a number of U.S. objectives in the Asia-Pacific**, ***including persuading Pyongyang to surrender its own nuclear program*, according Japan a heightened status among U.S. allies, and *keeping Southeast Asia’s budding nuclear energy programs on their current peaceful trajectories.*** Under the surface, however, **Washington’s opposition is likely due in part to its uncertainty over South Korea’s long-term nuclear intentions.** As noted above, **South Korea already has a history of covertly seeking nuclear arms**. That this took place before Seoul became a democracy is cold comfort to the U.S given that **South Koreans have at times been overwhelming in favor of their country acquiring nuclear weapons.** In other words, **at a time when the region is undergoing sweeping changes, the U.S. is increasingly less confident that South Korea will continue to rely on Washington for its security indefinitely. Indeed, there are already a number of signs that** Seoul is seeking greater autonomy. **These come at a time when the U.S. will need South Korea more than ever in order to properly rebalance its forces in the region.**

***New Asian prolif ensures widespread nuclear conflict --- asymmetries***

**Lyon 9** (December, Program Director, Strategy and International, with Australian Strategic Policy Institute, previously a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland, “A delicate issue, Asia’s nuclear future”)

**Deterrence relationships in Asia won’t look like East–West deterrence. They won’t be relationships of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and there will be many asymmetries among them. Regional nuclear-weapon states will articulate a spectrum of strategies ranging from existential deterrence to minimum deterrence to assured retaliation; and sometimes doctrinal statements will outrun capabilities.** The smaller arsenals of Asia and the absence of severe confrontations will help to keep doctrines at the level of generalised deterrence. Extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be important to US allies in East Asia, although it is hard to imagine other Asian nuclear weapon states ‘extending’ deterrence to their clients or allies. Alagappa’s propositions contain a ‘picture’ of what a more proliferated Asia might look like. It could well remain a region where deterrence dominates, and where arsenals are typically constrained: an Asia, in fact, that falls some way short of a ‘nuclear chaos’ model of unrestrained proliferation and mushrooming nuclear dangers. An order in flux? Notwithstanding Alagappa’s more reassuring view, we shouldn’t understate the extent of the looming change from a nuclear relationship based on bipolar symmetry to a set of relationships based on multiplayer asymmetries. As one observer has noted, when you add to that change the relatively constrained size of nuclear arsenals in Asia, the likelihood of further nuclear reductions by the US and Russia, and ballistic missile defences of uncertain effectiveness, the world is about to enter uncharted territory (Ford 2009:125). Some factors certainly act as stabilising influences on the current nuclear order, not least that nuclear weapons (here as elsewhere) typically induce caution, that the regional great powers tend to get along reasonably well with each other and that the region enters its era of nuclear pre-eminence inheriting a strong set of robust norms and regimes from the earlier nuclear era. But other factors imply a period of looming change: **geopolitical dynamism is rearranging strategic relationships; the number of risk-tolerant adversaries seems to be increasing**; most nuclear weapons states are modernising their arsenals; the American arsenal is ageing; and the US’s position of primacy is increasingly contested in Asia. Indeed, it may be that dynamism which could most seriously undermine the Solingen model of East Asian nonproliferation. Solingen, after all, has not attempted to produce a general theory about proliferation; she has attempted to explain only proliferation in the post-NPT age (see Solingen 2007:3), when the P-5 of the UN Security Council already had nuclear weapons. In essence, though, it’s exactly that broader geopolitical order that might be shifting. It isn’t yet clear how the Asian nuclear order will evolve. It’s one of those uncertainties that define Australia’s shifting strategic environment. It’s not too hard to imagine an order that’s more competitive than the one we see now. The ‘managed system of deterrence’ The second approach to thinking about the Asian nuclear order is to attempt to superimpose upon it William Walker’s two key mechanisms of the first nuclear age: the ‘managed system of deterrence’ and the ‘managed system of abstinence’. What might those ‘systems’ look like in Asia? In Walker’s model, the managed system of deterrence included: the deployment of military hardware under increasingly sophisticated command and control; the development of strategic doctrines to ensure mutual vulnerability and restraint; and the establishment of arms control processes through which policy elites engaged in dialogue and negotiated binding agreements. (Walker 2007:436) **It isn’t obvious that those core aspects of the ‘managed’ system are all central features of Asian nuclear relationships**. Perhaps most importantly, it isn’t obvious that the world even has a good model for how deterrence works in asymmetric relationships. Within the US, there’s been something of a revival of interest in matters nuclear as strategic analysts attempt to reconceptualise how nuclear relationships might work in the future. Recent work on the problems of exercising deterrence across asymmetrical strategic contests, for example, suggests a number of problems: ‘**In asymmetric conflict situations, deterrence may not only be unable to prevent violence but may also help foment it’ (Adler 2009:103). Some of the problems arise precisely because weaker players seem increasingly likely to ‘test’ stronger players’ threats—as part of a pattern of conflict that has emerged over recent centuries, in which weaker players have often prevailed against stronger opponents.**3 If we were to look at the case study of the India–Pakistan nuclear relationship—which is grounded in an enduring strategic rivalry, and therefore not ‘typical’ of the broader nuclear relationships in Asia—it’s a moot point whether Pakistani behaviour has been much altered by the ‘deterrence’ policies of India. Indeed, the case seems to show that Pakistan doesn’t even accept a long-term condition of strategic asymmetry with India, and that it intends to use its nuclear weapons as an ‘equaliser’ against India’s larger conventional forces by building a nuclear arsenal larger than the Indian arsenal arrayed against it. That would imply, more broadly, that **increasing strategic rivalries across Asia could be accompanied by efforts to minimise asymmetrical disadvantages between a much wider range of players. In short, in a more competitive Asian strategic environment, nuclear asymmetries that are tolerable now might well become less tolerable.** Furthermore, we need to think about how we might ‘codify’ deterrence in Asia. In the Cold War days, the MAD doctrine tended to be reflected in arms control accords that limited wasteful spending and corralled the competition. As Walker acknowledges, the agreements were important ‘stabilisers’ of the broader nuclear relationship, but to what extent can they be replicated in conditions of asymmetry? It might be possible to codify crisis management procedures, but designing (and verifying) **limitations on weapons numbers would seem to be much more difficult when the arsenals are of uneven size, and when the weaker party (perhaps both parties) would probably be relying on secrecy about the numbers and locations of weapons to minimise the vulnerability** of their arsenals.

***Extinction***

**Hayes 10** Peter Hayes, \*Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND, Michael Hamel-Green, \*\* Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf

But the **catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome**. **New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming**. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view:  That is not global winter, but **the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years.** The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…**The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use.** Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the **great powers, especially** the **nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis**, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. **There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states**. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

### DA 2

#### Comprehensive immigration reform is top of the docket and will pass --- Obama’s PC key

Grant 12/29 David Grant | The Christian Science Monitor | Dec 29, 2012, Alaska Dispatch, US immigration reform: Is 'amnesty' a possibility for illegal immigrants now?, <http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/us-immigration-reform-amnesty-possibility-illegal-immigrants-now>, jj

The momentum of President Obama's resounding victory in November's election – with a big push from Latinos and other minority groups – has catapulted immigration policy to the top of Washington's 2013 agenda, making reform not only possible but also likely.

The shift in the political conversation has been so dramatic that even a pathway to citizenship for some of the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States – long rejected out of hand by most Republicans and some Democrats – could be part of the deal.

The task is momentous. It involves weighing the wishes of industries from agriculture to high-tech, as well as the sensitivities of opening the door to immigrant workers at a time when unemployment remains high.

The past only reinforces the potential difficulties ahead. In 1986, Republicans felt betrayed when Democrats stripped the enforcement provisions from a bill that offered citizenship to some 3 million illegal immigrants. By 2005, the issue had become so politically toxic to conservatives that they blocked President George W. Bush's push for a new round of immigration reform.

Yet with Election 2012 highlighting the electoral consequences of America's changing demographics, the next year appears to be ripe for compromise. How reforms might take shape could be a major point of contention between the parties, but lawmakers on both sides suddenly see an opportunity for what could be their most expansive achievement of 2013.

"It has to be in 2013," says Rep. Raúl Labrador (R) of Idaho, an immigration lawyer who thundered into Congress in the tea party wave of 2010. "If we wait until 2014, it's going to be election time. And you know how efficient we are here during election time."

Recent weeks have seen a flurry of activity on Capitol Hill. In the Senate, a "Gang of Eight" – led by longtime immigration reformers Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York and Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina – has added freshman Sens. Michael Bennett (D) of Colorado and Mike Lee (R) of Utah, while potential 2016 presidential aspirant Sen. Marco Rubio (R) of Florida leads his own initiative.

Members of the House have seen movement, too. "One thing clearly has changed," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D) of Illinois, the lawmaker who co-wrote a 2005 comprehensive immigration reform measure with now Sen.-elect Jeff Flake (R) of Arizona. "Nobody is talking about self-deportation. Nobody is talking about how [Arizona's controversial immigration law] should be the standard applied across the land. Nobody is talking about vetoing the DREAM Act," which offers a path to citizenship for some young undocumented immigrants.

"We are having wonderful conversations," Representative Gutierrez says.

That more moderate tone from the GOP is what the November election has wrought.

***Conflicting priorities means incentives for emerging nuclear technologies costs PC and gridlocks Congress --- the debate is stalemated now***

**Bryce ‘10**

Robert Bryce, has been writing about energy for nearly two decades. His articles have appeared in dozens of publications ranging from The Atlantic Monthly to The Guardian, and The Nation to The American Conservative. He is the author of Pipe Dreams: Greed, Ego, and the Death of Enron, and Cronies: Oil, the Bushes, and the Rise of Texas, America’s Superstate. Bryce is a fellow at the Institute for Energy Research, as well as the managing editor of Energy Tribune and a contributing writer for The Texas Observer.

“Power Hungry: The Myths of "Green" Energy and the Real Fuels of the Future” pg 269-270, jj

The answers are here. **What’s lacking aren’t answers, but political will**. **That’s not to say the challenge of handling nuclear waste can be solved easily or cheaply.** **Coming up with a long-term solution will take** years of work, lots of money, and **sustained support from Congress**. And that’s the crux of the problem: **Nuclear power requires strong governmental involvement**. One analyst summed it up well when he told me, “**The Re publicans like nuclear, but they hate government. The Democrats like government but they hate nuclear power** **And those conflicting views have contributed to the stalemate on nuclear power development in the United States.**

**That stalemate is most obvious when it comes to dealing with nu clear waste**. In 2009, the Obama administration—bowing to pressure from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, who hails from Nevada— decimated funding for the waste disposal site at Yucca Mountain. Ad ministration officials said they were abandoning the project and would begin looking for other waste sites.3 **Reids political power play has left the United States without a long-term program** or even the beginnings of one to deal with its spent nuclear fuel.4 **Reid’s NIMBY posturing may be handy politics** for Nevada, but it effectively renders moot a two- decade-old federal law that requires the federal government to take pos session of the high-level waste produced by the country’s nuclear power plants. It also means that the two decades and $13.5 billion of taxpayers’ money that has been spent researching and developing the site at Yucca Mountain (which is ready for use and only awaits licensing) has effec tively gone up in smoke— thereby adding just a bit more carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.5

***CIR solves Latin American relations and prevents massive instability***

Robert **Gittelson** (Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Policy) 20**09** “The Centrists Against the Ideologues: What Are the Falsehoods That Divide Americans on the Issue of Comprehensive Immigration Reform?” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1400764>

However, the above list of security enhancements is only a part of the overall security ramifications of CIR. For example, as everyone—including our enemies all over the world—knows, our military **manpower** is strained **to the limit. Our troops are on a seemingly endless loop of deployment**s, with no imminent relief in sight. Our **military recruiting officers are struggling to meet the vital new quotas for fresh servicemen and women**, and scandals have started to come to light of instances where we have waived or lowered our induction standards.28 We are also offering record high bonus inducements to lure potential recruits to join the armed forces.29 CIR can really help us **in this regard,** with the **potential** addition of millions of military age**, able-bodied** men and women**, should CIR allow them to legalize their status.** This would not only increase the **potential** pool of **new** recruits; it would allow the military to **once again** raise standards, and— because of the laws of supply and demand—**they could save much-needed revenue** by lowering the bonuses that they are currently offering due to the short supply of potential seamen, soldiers, and airmen. The long-term benefit to our country through the addition of these potential recruits is that these young men and women would receive valuable training for advancement in life in whatever career path they should choose. They would be able to take advantage of the laws governing accelerated citizenship for immigrants who serve in the military, and, of course, our country—and by extension **the entire world**—**would be safer because of this** provision of **CIR**. In the alternative, should we fail to pass CIR**,** and instead opt to deport or force attrition on these millions of economic refugees through an enforcement-only approach to our current undocumented immigrant difficulties, what would be the net result? Forgetting for now the devastating effect on our own economy, **and the worldwide reproach and loss of moral authority** that we would frankly deserve should we act so callously and thoughtlessly, there is another important political imperative to our **passing** CIR that affects our national security, and the security and political stability of our neighbors in our hemisphere. That is the very real threat of communism and/or socialism. First of all, the primary reason why millions of undocumented economic refugees migrated to the United States is because the economies of their home countries were unable to support them. They escaped extreme poverty and oppression, and risked literally everything they had, including their lives and their freedom, to come to this country to try to work hard and support themselves and their families. Deporting our illegal immigrant population back to **primarily** Latin America would boost the communist **and socialist** movements in that **part of our** hemisphere, and if the anti-immigrationists only understood that fact, they might re-think their “line in the sand” position on what they insist on calling “amnesty.” Communism thrives where hope is lost. **The economies of Latin American nations are struggling to barely reach a level of meager subsistence for the population that has remained at home;** Mexico, for example, has already lost 14% of their able-bodied workers to U.S. migration.30 Without the billions of dollars in remissions **from these nations’ expatriates working in the United States that go back to help support their remaining family members**, the economies of many of these countries**, most of whom are in fact our allies,** would **certainly** collapse, or at least deteriorate to dangerously unstable levels. The addition of millions of unemployed and frustrated deported people who would go to the end of the theoretical unemployment lines of these already devastated economies would **surely** cause massive unrest and anti-American sentiment. The issue of comprehensive immigration reform is not simply a domestic issue. In our modern global economy, everything that we do, as the leaders of that global economy, affects the entire world, and most especially our region of the world. If we were to naively initiate actions that would lead to the destabilization of **the** Mexican and **many Central and** South American governments, while at the same time **causing serious harm to our own economy** (but I digress . . .), it would most assuredly lead to disastrous economic and political consequences. By the way, I’m not simply theorizing here. In point of fact, over the past few years, eight countries in Latin America have elected leftist leaders. Just last year, Guatemala swore in their first leftist president in more than fifty years, Alvaro Colom.31 He joins a growing list. Additional countries besides Guatemala, Venezuela,32 and Nicaragua33 that have sworn in extreme left wing leaders in Latin America recently include Brazil,34 Argentina,35 Bolivia,36 Ecuador,37 and Uruguay.38 This phenomenon is not simply a coincidence; it is a trend. **The political infrastructure of Mexico is under extreme pressure** from the left.39 Do we really want a leftist movement on our southern border? If our political enemies such as the communists Chavez in Venezuela and Ortega in Nicaragua **are** call**ing** the shots in Latin America, what kind of cooperation can we expect **in our battle to secure our southern border**?

***The impact is global great power wars***

**Rochin ‘94**  
Rochin, Professor of Political Science, ‘94 James, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College, Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America, pp. 130-131

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. **Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region** – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – **were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere**. Hence, **the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region.** Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, **instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena** – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that **such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war**. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

### CP

***The government of Virginia should end its moratorium on uranium mining. The United States federal government should not grant any further nuclear licenses.***

***CP prevents uranium crunch***

**Taylor 11/14** – James M. Taylor (jtaylor@heartland.org) is senior fellow for environment policy at The Heartland Institute. November 14, 2012, Uranium Mining Would Be an Environmentally Friendly Boon for Virginia and the Nation, <http://heartland.org/editorial/2012/11/14/uranium-mining-would-be-environmentally-friendly-boon-virginia-and-nation>, jj

**One particularly glaring example of America needlessly failing to take advantage of its natural resources is** the **uranium** that fuels our nuclear power plants. **The United States currently imports 90 percent of the uranium we use, in spite of our abundant uranium reserves.**

Under an agreement with the former Soviet Union, we imported 25 percent of our uranium with the purpose of dismantling old nuclear missiles. That program is expiring and under a new agreement, purchasers of uranium will buy mined uranium from a Russian government-owned company. Disarmament is no longer the ultimate purpose for importing uranium for our 104 nuclear power plants.

**The nation’s largest untapped uranium deposit, the 14th largest in the world, sits untouched near** the rural southern **Virginia** town of Chatham, **even though the owner of the land that contains the uranium wants to mine the valuable resource. A statewide moratorium on uranium mining stands in the way.**

Virginia public officials are considering lifting the ban. For the good of the nation, the state, and the Chatham region, **Virginia officials should lift the moratorium.**

**The Chatham uranium deposit is so lucrative that mining it would increase domestic uranium production by more than 50 percent**. By itself, **the Chatham uranium deposit would go a long way toward making our nation energy self-sufficient**. **This is exactly what Republican and Democratic leaders alike say we need to do to make our nation economically strong and secure.**

The people in and around Chatham would justly reap the greatest economic benefits from uranium production. A state-commissioned study found **uranium mining would create $5 billion in economic activity and support 1,000 jobs**. Most of that would occur in the Chatham region and benefit current residents.

The average job in Pittsylvania County today commands a salary near $39,000 per year. An employee at Coles Hill would make an average salary of $65,000 per year. Why should anyone deny this community the opportunity to improve the quality of life for its residents?

**Uranium is mined safely in Arizona, Colorado, Texas, and other states. It is mined safely in Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia. If Kazakhstan is capable of safely mining uranium, Virginia surely is, too.**

**A multitude of federal and state agencies would oversee uranium mining in Virginia and make sure it is safe for human health and the environment**. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration are just a few of the federal agencies that would oversee and regulate any mining activities. Virginia health and environment agencies would provide additional monitoring, oversight, and regulation.

**Uranium mining is a safe and economical way to boost our domestic energy production**. **Virginia** officials **should act in the best interests of the nation**, state, and southern Virginia region **and lift the uranium production moratorium**.

### CP 2

#### Text: The fifty state governments and the District of Columbia should: provide a twenty-percent investment tax credit for the deployment of domestic nuclear fuel recycling.

***State incentives key to nuclear power development***

Lisa **Janairo** is a senior policy analyst at The council of State Governments, Jan **2009**, http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/TIA\_nuclear\_final\_3.pdf

**States may play a significant role in bringing about the nuclear renaissance**. While regulating nuclear reactor safety is a federal function, **states make the final decision on whether new plants can be built** **and**, if so, **how the costs will be passed to consumers. Anticipating the coming nuclear renaissance**, **states** such as Florida and South Carolina **have positioned themselves to tap the development of new plants by making it easier for utilities to finance new projects.**

### Solvency

#### Uranium prices need to be 700 dollars per kilogram for reprocessing to be competitive

Dennis et. al 09 – Kate J. Dennis and Christopher D. Holmes are PhD candidates at Harvard University’s Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences. Kurt Z. House is the president of Cambridge-based C12 Energy. Benjamin G. Lee is a postdoctoral researcher at the National Renewable Energy Lab in Golden, Colorado. Lee T. Murray, Justin Parrella, and Jason Rugolo are PhD candidates at Harvard’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. David M. Romps is a research scientist at Harvard’s Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences. Mark T. Winkler is a PhD candidate at Harvard’s Department of Physics. The two undecideds, Jacob J. Krich and Ernst A. van Nierop, contributed to this article as well. Krich is a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Center for the Environment; van Nierop is the director of engineering at C12 Energy. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009, The case against nuclear Reprocessing, DoI: 10.2968/065006003, <http://www.davidmthompson.org/2009/reprocessing/09reprocessing.pdf>, jj

Reprocessing is not cost effective. In order for reprocessing to make sense economically, the price of a new MOX fuel rod must be competitive with the price of a new uranium fuel rod, which largely depends on the price of mined uranium. Several studies have concluded that the price of uranium would have to be in the range of $400–$700 per kilogram in order for reprocessed MOX to break even. But for the first half of 2009, the price of uranium oxide has hovered around $100 per kilogram. In fact, uranium prices have reached $300 per kilogram (in 2008 dollars) only twice in history—in the late 1970s during the energy crisis and briefly in the summer of 2007. In other words, uranium has never sustained a price that would make reprocessing profitable. And given the large estimated resources of uranium available at or below $130 per kilogram, it is unlikely that reprocessing will become cost competitive any time in the foreseeable future. The high expense of reprocessing is rooted in the fact that chemically separating and processing spent nuclear fuel requires large, complex facilities that produce significant quantities of radioactive and chemical wastes. These facilities also must meet modern health and safety standards for dealing with highly toxic plutonium, which adds to the expense. In addition, these facilities produce weaponsusable plutonium and must be operated under military guard, which adds more costs to the process. At the same time, it is difficult to recoup all of these expenses when reprocessing yields so little usable product—only one MOX fuel rod is produced for every seven spent uranium fuel rods reprocessed. That means, for all of the investment and operating costs, reprocessing boosts the usable energy extracted from mined uranium only about 14 percent.

***Reprocessing doesn’t solve waste***

**Bunn 05** – Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project. Written Testimony The Case Against a Near-Term Decision to Reprocess Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW BUNN FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUNE 16, 2005, <http://live.belfercenter.org/publication/3273/case_against_a_nearterm_decision_to_reprocess_spent_nuclear_fuel_in_the_united_states.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F368%2Fmatthew_bunn%3Fgroupby%3D0%26hide%3D1%26id%3D368%26back_url%3D%25252Fexperts%25252F%26%253Bback_text%3DBack%252Bto%252Blist%252Bof%252Bexperts%26filter%3D2005>, jj

First, **reprocessing** by itself **does not make any of the nuclear waste go away**. **Whatever course we choose, we will still need a nuclear waste repository such as Yucca Mountain**. **Reprocessing is simply a chemical process that separates the radioactive materials in spent fuel into different components**. In the traditional process, known as PUREX, reprocessing produces separated plutonium (which is weapons-usable), recovered uranium, and high-level waste (containing all the other transuranic elements and fission products). **In the process, intermediate and low-level wastes are also generated**. **More advanced processes now being examined**, such as UREX+ and pyroprocessing, attempt to address some of the problems of the PUREX process, **but whether they will do so successfully remains to be seen**. Once the spent fuel has been reprocessed, the plutonium and uranium separated from the spent fuel can in principle be recycled into new fuel; in the more advanced processes, some other long-lived species would also be irradiated in reactors (or accelerator-driven assemblies) to transmute them into shorter-lived species.

### Warming

***Reprocessing increases nuclear waste and leads to ocean dumping***

**Charman, 6** – Karen, environmental journalist and managing editor at the Capitalism Nature Socialism journal (“Brave Nuclear World?/Commentary: Nuclear revival? Don’t bet on it!”, July/august, Vol. 19, pg. 12, Proquest)

UCS's Ed **Lyman says it is "a myth" that reprocessing spent nuclear fuel reduces the volume of nuclear waste: "All reprocessing does is take spent fuel that's compact, and it spreadssmears-it out into dozens of different places**." Current reprocessing technology uses nitric acid to dissolve the fuel assemblies and separate out plutonium and uranium. But **it also leaves behind numerous extremely radioactive fission products as well as high-level liquid waste that is typically solidified in glass. In the process, a lot of radioactive gas is discharged into the environment, and there is additional liquid waste that's too expensive to isolate, he says: "So, that's just dumped into the ocean-that's the practice in France and the U.K."**

***Turns biodiversity***

**Coyne and Hoekstra, 07 -** \*professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago AND \*\* Associate Professor in the Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University (Jerry and Hopi, The New Republic, “The Greatest Dying,” 9/24, <http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatest-dying>)

    In many ways, **oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides**. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion.

    In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber. **Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed.** Yet that is where we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace.

***The spent fuel issue can be postponed – current on site storage solves***

**Diaz, 06 –** PhD, Florida (Nils, HEARING OF THE ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND RELATED AGENCIES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE SUBJECT: NUCLEAR ENERGY OVERSIGHT, September 13, L/n

**Commercial nuclear fuel has been and is safely and secured stored on site or off site in wet pools or dry storage casts and safety transported when needed. A** viable, practical and credible **solution to the end of the fuel cycle** is sorely needed here and abroad, but **it's not needed immediately, and it must not be a prerequisite for the growth of nuclear energy.**

***Waste problems have been solved- New Mexico’s Waste Isolation Plant could hold all waste produced for decades***

**Cravens, 2002** (Gwyneth, “Terrorism and Nuclear Energy: Understanding the Risks”, <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/spring_weapons_cravens.aspx>)

**Challenges regarding subterranean disposal have already been solved. Because of breakthrough methodologies evolved during construction** (by the Energy Department) and certification (by the EPA), **New Mexico's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is the world's first successful deep geologic repository for the permanent isolation of federal** (as opposed to commercial) **nuclear waste. It is a model** for other nations. For political reasons, WIPP is permitted by Congress and the state of New Mexico to accept only certain military waste. But nearly **1,000 detailed studies, as well as an innovation in probabilistic risk assessment invented by WIPP's scientists, have demonstrated that its remoteness, size, and stable geological and climatological features make it the safest place to store any type of waste**. In fact, if enlarged or annexed, **the WIPP could hold all U.S. nuclear waste generated for decades to come.**

#### Obama has already taken action on warming via efficiency measures – should have solved leadership

#### And, their Roberts card is not about the plan --- no internal link to leadership – cx proves

***Nuclear energy doesn’t solve warming --- too slow and doesn’t address all emissions***

**Squassoni ‘09**

Sharon Squassoni, Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, 12-10-09, Who's Right?: Climate Change Experts Debate Nuclear Energy <http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/10/who-s-right-climate-change-experts-debate-nuclear-energy/1lii>, jj

First, Squassoni questions the practicality of switching to nuclear energy. **Building sufficient nuclear capacity would take many years, while the need to reduce *g*reen*h*ouse *g*asses is immediate**, she says. She argues **the key to reducing energy consumption lies not just in replacing fuel but in improving energy efficiency.** **Switching to nuclear power would not immediately address emissions from other sources, such as cars, homes, businesses and industries.** While she agrees that a sense of panic won’t speed the process of replacing fossil fuels with nuclear power, Squassoni believes **the climate change issue is urgent enough to require faster solutions —** the leaders of the G8 countries have set 2015 as the year when carbon dioxide emissions cannot rise any higher. She also argues that **private financial investors have shown little interest in funding the high cost of nuclear plants and are more focused on smaller renewable projects that offer a faster return**. In addition, the hazards of nuclear waste and the possible proliferation of nuclear fuel for weapons are major concerns. **Efficiency**, she says, **is the fastest and safest way to reduce emissions.** Finally, **even if the world had 30 years to bring carbon dioxide emissions down, immediate action still would be the most methodical and logical approach**, Squassoni argues. **Since free markets favor coal as the cheapest energy source, governments still would have to act as soon as possible to make fast and low-cost changes that offer the least overall risk.** **Energy efficiency is not an abstract concept, but one that consumers easily can see in homes and offices. Ways to use less energy are not hard to find and are the fastest routes to reducing emissions.** Also, **using a mix of energy sources is better than relying on a single source, such as nuclear power**. Even if **nuclear energy** is included in the mechanism that rewards developed countries for investing in clean technologies in developing countries, it likely **would be too expensive even for the wealthiest of developed countries.**

***The environment is resilient but nuclear war turns it***

**Schweickart 10** – David Schweickart 10 is Professor at Loyola University Chicago. He holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics (University of Virginia), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy (Ohio State University). “Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible?” Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 41 (2010) 6739–6752

**It is *not true*** either **that the various ecological crises we are facing will bring about “the end of the world**.” Consider the projections of the Stern Review, the recently released report commissioned by the British Government. If nothing is done, we risk “major disruption to economic and social activity, later in this century and the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and economic depression of the first half of the 20th century.”¶ This is serious. Some **sixty million people died in World War Two. The Stern Review estimates as many as 200 million people could be** permanently **displaced by rising sea level and drought**. But **this is not “the end of the world.” Even if the effects are far worse, resulting in billions of deaths—a highly unlikely scenario**—**there would still be lots of us left**. **If three-quarters of the present population perished, that would still leave us with 1.6 billion people—the population of the planet in 1900.** ¶ **I say this** not to minimize the potentially horrific impact of relentless environmental destruction, but **to caution against exaggeration. We are not talking about thermonuclear war—which could have *extinguish***ed ***us*** as a species. (It still might.) And we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that **millions of people** on the planet right now, **caught up in savage civil wars or terrorized by U.S. bombers** (which dropped some 100,000 lbs. of explosives on a Baghdad neighborhood during one ten-day period in January 2008—the amount the fascists used to level the Basque town of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War), **are faced with conditions more terrible than anyone here is likely to face in his or her lifetime due to environmental degradation.**

***2) No extinction from warming***

**NIPCC 11** – the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, an international panel of nongovernment scientists and scholars, March 8, 2011, “Surviving the Unprecedented Climate Change of the IPCC,” online: http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

On the other hand, they indicate that some **biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change** (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), **and yet biotic communities have remained *remarkably resilient*** (Mayle and Power, 2008) **and in some cases thrived** (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although **the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records."**

Going on to do just that, **Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity**." And **what emerges from those studies**, as they describe it, **"is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another**." And, **most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world."**

In concluding, **the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable *biotic resilience* to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."**

***No impact, it actually increases bio-diversity***

**Lovett 9-3-12** (Richard A. Lovett is frequent contributor to Nature. 9-3-12, Nature – International Weekly Journal of Science, Species multiply as Earth heats up, <http://www.nature.com/news/species-multiply-as-earth-heats-up-1.11350>, jj)

**Rather than kicking off the expected cycles of extinction, periods of warming in Earth's history were accompanied by increased biodiversity, according to a report published this week**. But this does not mean that the mass extinctions that are taking place today, with Earth warming at an unprecedented rate, will be reversed in future. **Researchers examined the number of known families of marine invertebrates, as well as sea-surface temperatures, over the course of 540 million years of Earth's history**1. **They found that when temperatures were high, so was biodiversity. When temperatures fell, biodiversity also declined. The results contradict previous work**, including findings from lead author Peter Mayhew's group2, that reported an inverse correlation between high temperatures and biodiversity. The reason for the about-face, says Mayhew, an evolutionary ecologist at the University of York, UK, is that the earlier work measured fossil diversity by tallying the first and last appearances of each group of species, then assuming that the creatures existed only during the intervening years. This might sound logical, but overlooks the fact that some geological periods are better studied than others. To correct this, the new study looked only at the well-sampled periods. And, instead of interpolating organisms' presence from origination and extinction dates, it merely tallied species groups present during each period. Even so, given that climate change is generally viewed as disruptive, Mayhew admits **it was a "big surprise" to find that eras of warming were accompanied by increases in biodiversity**. The work also provided a solution to another puzzle, Mayhew says. **Tropical ecosystems are known to be Earth's most diverse, and the tropics would be expected to expand during warm eras**. Yet in the past these eras were thought to be species-poor compared with cooler ones. The new results resolve that contradiction.

***Biodiversity resilient – ecosystems will quickly recover from damage***

**McDermott** 20**09** (Mat, Editor for Business and Energy sections; Master Degree from NYU’s Center for Global Affairs in environment and energy policy. May, 27, 2009: “Good News: Most Ecosystems Can Recover in One Lifetime from Human-Induced or Natural Disturbance”; <http://www.treehugger.com/natural-sciences/good-news-most-ecosystems-can-recover-in-one-lifetime-from-human-induced-or-natural-disturbance.html>)

**There's a reason the phrase "let nature take its course" exists**: New research done at the Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Science reinforces the idea that **ecosystems are quiet resilient and can rebound from pollution and environmental degradation**. Published in the journal PLoS ONE, the study shows that **most damaged ecosystems worldwide can recover within a single lifetime**, if the source of pollution is removed and restoration work done. The analysis found that **on average forest ecosystems can recover in 42 years, while in takes only about 10 years for the ocean bottom to recover**. If an area has seen multiple, interactive disturbances, it can take on average 56 years for recovery. In general, most ecosystems take longer to recover from human-induced disturbances than from natural events, such as hurricanes.

To reach these recovery averages, the researchers looked at data from peer-reviewed studies over the past 100 years on the rate of ecosystem recovery once the source of pollution was removed.

Interestingly, the researchers found that **it appears that the rate at which an ecosystem recovers may be independent of its degraded condition: Aquatic systems may recover more quickly than, say, a forest, because the species and organisms that live in that ecosystem turn over more rapidly than in the forest.**

As to what this all means, Oswald Schmitz, professor of ecology at Yale and report co-author, says that this analysis shows that an increased effort to restore damaged ecosystems is justified, and that:

Restoration could become a more important tool in the management portfolio of conservation organizations that are entrusted to protect habitats on landscapes.

We recognize that **humankind has and will continue to actively domesticate nature to meet its own needs**. The message of our paper is that **recovery is possible and can be rapid for many ecosystems**, giving much hope for a transition to sustainable management of global ecosystems.

***No food impact***

**Idso & Idso**, June 15th, 20**11** (Craig D, PhD, Sherwood B, CO2 Science, “Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future Pursuing the Prudent Path” <http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf>, jj)

**So with megadroughts occurring at cooler-than-present temperatures and with no-analog megadroughts occurring at warmer-than-present temperatures, one must consider the possibility that something other than temperature is the driving force behind their occurrence. And there are a number of scientists who feel that that “something other” is solar variability**, such as Black et al. (1999), who stated that “small changes in solar output may influence Atlantic variability on centennial time scales,” Yu and Ito (1999), who felt forced “to consider solar variability as the major cause of century-scale drought frequency in the northern Great Plains,” Dean and Schwalb (2000), who concluded “**it seems reasonable that the cycles in aridity and eolian activity over the past several thousand years recorded in the sediments of lakes in the northern Great Plains might also have a solar connection,**” Verschuren et al. (2000), who indicated that **variations in solar activity “may have contributed to decade-scale rainfall variability in equatorial east Africa**,” Hodell et al. (2001), who wrote that “**a significant component of century-scale variability in Yucatan droughts is explained by solar forcing,**” Mensing et al. (2004), who concluded that “**changes in solar irradiance may be a possible mechanism influencing century-scale drought in the western Great Basin” of the United States**, Asmerom et al. (2007), who suggest that a solar link to Holocene climate operates “through changes in the Walker circulation and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation and El Niño-Southern Oscillation systems of the tropical Pacific Ocean,” Garcin et al. (2007), who emphasize that the positive correlation of Lake Masoko hydrology with various solar activity proxies “implies a forcing of solar activity on the atmospheric circulation and thus on the regional climate of [a] part of East Africa,” and Springer et al. (2008), who say their findings “corroborate works indicating that millennial-scale solar-forcing is responsible for droughts and ecosystem changes in central and eastern North America,” In one final and exceptionally perceptive paper dealing with North American droughts, Cook et al. (2009) wrote that “IPCC Assessment Report 4 model projections suggest that the subtropical dry zones of the world will both dry and expand poleward in the future due to greenhouse warming,” and that “the US southwest is particularly vulnerable in this regard and model projections indicate a progressive drying there out to the end of the 21st century.” However, they then wrote that “**the USA has been in a state of drought over much of the West for about 10 years now,” and that “while severe, this turn of the century drought has not yet clearly exceeded the severity of two exceptional droughts in the 20th century**,” so that “while the coincidence between the turn of the century drought and projected drying in the Southwest is cause for concern, **it is premature to claim that the model projections are correct**.” We begin to understand this fact when we compare the “turn of the century drought” with the two “exceptional droughts” that preceded it by a few decades. Based on gridded instrumental Palmer Drought Severity indices for tree ring reconstruction that extend back to 1900, Cook et al. calculated that the turn-of-the-century drought had its greatest Drought Area Index value of 59% in the year 2002, while the Great Plains/Southwest drought covered 62% of the US in its peak year of 1954, and the Dust Bowl drought covered 77% of the US in 1934. In terms of drought duration, however, things are not quite as clear. Stahle et al. (2007) estimated that the first two droughts lasted for 12 and 14 years, respectively; Seager et al. (2005) estimated them to have lasted for 8 and 10 years; and Andreadis et al. (2005) estimated them to have lasted for 7 and 8 years, yielding means of 9 and 11 years for the two exceptional droughts, which durations are to be compared to 10 or so years for the turn-of-the-century drought, which again makes the latter drought not unprecedented compared to those that occurred earlier in the 20th century. **Real clarity, however, comes when the turn-of-the-century drought is compared to droughts of the prior millennium.** Cook et al. write that “**perhaps the most famous example is the ‘Great Drouth’** (sic) of AD 1276-1299 described by A.E. Douglass (1929, 1935).” **Yet this 24-year drought was eclipsed by the 38-year drought that was found by Weakley** (1965) **to have occurred in Nebraska from AD 1276 to 1313**, which Cook et al. say “may have been a more prolonged northerly extension of the ‘Great Drouth’.” **But even these multi-decade droughts truly pale in comparison to the “two extraordinary droughts discovered by Stine** (1994) **in California that lasted more than two centuries before AD 1112 and more than 140 years before AD 1350**.” And each of these megadroughts, as Cook et al. describe them, occurred, in their words, “in the so-called Medieval Warm Period.” And they add that “**all of this happened prior to the strong greenhouse gas warming that began with the Industrial Revolution** [authors’ italics].” In further ruminating about these facts in the “Conclusions and Recommendations” section of their paper, Cook et al. again state that **the medieval megadroughts “occurred without any need for enhanced radiative forcing due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas forcing**.” And, therefore, they go on to say “**there is no guarantee that the response of the climate system to greenhouse gas forcing will result in megadroughts of the kind experienced by North America in the pas**t**.” In summation, these and many other studies conducted at various locations throughout North America -**- Laird et al. (1998), Woodhouse and Overpeck (1998), Cronin et al. (2000), Fritz et al. (2000), Hidalgo et al. (2000), Benson et al. (2002), Knapp et al. (2002), Ni et al. (2002), Gray et al. (2003), Gedalof et al. (2004), Gray et al. (2004a,b), Mauget (2004), Mensing et al. (2004), Quiring (2004), Daniels and Knox (2005), Forman et al. (2005), Shapley et al. (2005), Rasmussen et al. (2006), Malamud-Roam et al. (2006), Tian et al. (2006), Woodhouse et al. (2006), Woodhouse and Lukas (2006), MacDonald and Tingstad (2007), Meko et al. (2007), MacDonald et al. (2008) and Springer et al. (2008) -- **dispute the climate-alarmist claim that warming must always result in more frequent and more severe drought, while studies conducted on other continents have led to the same conclusion**. However, to not unnecessarily lengthen this section of our report, we conclude it by merely providing the journal references to some of these studies in the following paragraph.

***\*\*4) No tipping points***

**IHRR 12** (Institute of Hazard, Risk and Resilience, “Moving beyond ‘the tipping point of climate change,’” 5/4, <http://ihrrblog.org/2012/05/04/moving-beyond-the-tipping-point-of-climate-change/>)

To begin, we are now observing **climate change** solely from the period of **today** or in the relatively recent past, which **is a very small part of what came before it millions of years ago**. Antony Long found the use of tipping point to describe climate change potentially nihilistic or disempowering for thinking about climate change when in fact we should be moving the other way. Also, **tipping points may not necessarily be irreversible which is how climate change is often portrayed**. While less complex than the climate problem ozone depletion was seen as veering towards a tipping point, but **as production of CFCs ceased the ozone layer restored over time.**

***5) Not anthropogenic***

**Bast and Taylor 11** – \*CEO of the Heartland Institute, author of Rebuilding America’s Schools (1990), Why We Spend Too Much on Health Care (1992) Eco-Sanity: A Common-Sense Guide to Environmentalism (1994) Education & Capitalism (2003), Climate Change Reconsidered (2009), and The Patriot’s Toolbox (2010, rev. ed. 2011), \*\* managing editor of Environment & Climate News, Senior Fellow for The Heartland Institute, bachelors degree from Dartmouth College and law degree from the Syracuse University College of Law, (Joseph and James, “Global Warming: Not a Crisis,” The Heartland Institute, 8/2/11, http://heartland.org/ideas/global-warming-not-crisis)

Natural or Man-Made? **The** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change **(IPCC),** an agency of the United Nations, **claims the warming that has occurred since the mid-twentieth century “is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations**” (IPCC, 2007). Many climate scientists disagree with the IPCC on this key issue. As Idso and Singer wrote in 2009, **The IPCC does not apply generally accepted methodologies to determine what fraction of current warming is natural, or how much is caused by the rise in** greenhouse gases (**GHG**). **A comparison of “fingerprints” from best available observations with the results of state-of-the-art GHG models leads to the conclusion that the (human-caused) GHG contribution is minor. This fingerprint evidence, though available, was ignored by the IPCC. The IPCC continues to undervalue the overwhelming evidence that**, on decadal and century-long time scales, **the Sun and associated atmospheric cloud effects are responsible for much of past climate change. It is** therefore **highly likely that the Sun is also a major cause of twentieth-century warming, with anthropogenic GHG making only a minor contribution**. In addition, the IPCC ignores, or addresses imperfectly, other science issues that call for discussion and explanation (Idso and Singer, 2009). Scientists who study the issue say it is impossible to tell if the recent small warming trend is natural, a continuation of the planet’s recovery from the more recent “Little Ice Age,” or unnatural, the result of human greenhouse gas emissions. **Thousands of peer-reviewed articles point to natural sources of climate variability that could explain some or even all of the warming in the second half of the twentieth century** (Idso and Singer, 2009). S. Fred Singer and Dennis Avery **documented natural climate cycles of approximately 1,500 years going back hundreds of thousands of years** (Singer and Avery, second edition 2008). It is clear from climate records that **the Earth was warmer than it is now in recorded human history, before man-made greenhouse gas emissions could have been the cause.** We know enough about how the Earth’s climate works to know that biological and physical processes remove CO2 from the atmosphere at a faster rate when concentration levels are higher and release more heat into space when temperatures rise. These feedback factors and radiative forcings are poorly modeled or missing from the computer models that alarmists use to make their forecasts. The arguments are complex, but the debate over natural versus man-made climate change is unquestionably still ongoing. The more we learn, the less likely it becomes that human greenhouse gas emissions can explain more than a small amount of the climate change we witness.

***6) Alt causes---Yellowstone, China, India***

**Kreutzer** 12-14-**10** (David, Senior Policy Analyst in Energy Economics and Climate Change at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Data Analysis, Heritage, “EPA Can’t Regulate Volcanoes or China” <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/12/14/epa-can%e2%80%99t-regulate-volcanoes-or-china/>, jj)

An ongoing study in Yellowstone National Park seeks to measure the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) as a response to geologic activity and as a possible predictor of some geologic events. A [story covering this study](http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_0d6cd494-ebad-502d-88bc-0cb6eea6898b.html) notes that **researchers estimate that Yellowstone emits 45,000 tons of CO2 per day. That is about 16.5 million tons per year. The** [**EPA estimates**](http://www.epa.gov/oms/consumer/f00013.htm) **that the average car emits between five and six tons of CO2 per year. So natural geologic activity in Yellowstone contributes CO2 equivalent to about 3 million cars.** The current **attempts** by the EPA **to limit CO2 emissions** would [be dangerous for the American economy](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/05/EPA-Global-Warming-Regs-Dangerous), but they **would have no impact on the millions of tons Yellowstone emits every year**. More seriously, the EPA **regulations would also have little impact on the billions of additional tons of CO2 that China, India, and the developing world will emit each year § Marked 21:47 § in the decades ahead.** As a result, the regulations would have damaging impacts on the American economy, but just like cap-and-trade restrictions, **they would have** [**negligible impact on world temperatures**](http://www.masterresource.org/2009/05/part-i-a-climate-analysis-of-the-waxman-markey-climate-bill%E2%80%94the-impacts-of-us-actions-alone/).

**Peak Uranium FL**

***Nuclear energy low globally --- uranium demand down***

**Tickell ‘12**

Oliver Tickell [of Tickell ’08 warming impact fame] for Resurgence & the Ecologist, part of the Guardian Environment Network, 8-20-12, the Guardian, Does the world need nuclear power to solve the climate crisis? <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/aug/20/world-need-nuclear-power-climate-crisis?newsfeed=true>, jj

**Given that nuclear power generation has flatlined over the last decade, and has sharply declined in the last few years, that looks like a tall order**. **There are currently plans for about 200 new nuclear reactors around the world, mainly in China, the Middle East and the USA. But few observers expect** all of **these to be built, since the economics of nuclear power are unattractive to private investors, owing to high construction cost, long lead time, electricity price uncertainty, political hazard and long-term liabilities**. **Realistically the world might build 100 or so new reactors over the coming decade** or so – perhaps one every 35–50 days. **Over this same period a similar number of existing reactors will reach the end of their lives and close, leading to a net growth rate *close to zero*.** That does not mean it's impossible to build 11,000 reactors in 35 years if the world dedicates sufficient resources to the task. **At a construction cost of about US$10 billion per reactor, we would need to dedicate US$110 trillion, or about two years' gross world product, while also providing for long-term liabilities**. But before we seriously consider doing so, we should ask what an 11,000-reactor world would be like.

***Qualified studies conclude no uranium shortage***

**Biello 10**—David Biello has been covering energy and the environment for nearly a decade, the last four years as an associate editor at Scientific American. He also hosts 60-Second Earth, a Scientific American podcast covering environmental news, and is working on a documentary with Detroit Public Television on the future of electricity. 9-18-10, Scientific American, Is Spent Nuclear Fuel a Waste or a Resource? <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-spent-nuclear-fuel-waste-or-resource>, jj

As President Obama's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future continues to ponder what role nuclear power might play in the U.S. electricity supply, **a group of scientists, engineers and other experts assembled by the** Massachusetts Institute of Technology (**M.I.T.) released a report on the nuclear fuel cycle** paid for by the nuclear industry. In short, **the report finds that uranium resources are not likely to run out in the next century, even if the U.S. alone builds as many as 1,000 nuclear reactors**. **Therefore**, either **reprocessing** or recycling spent nuclear fuel, as the French and Japanese do, **is likely to be a waste of money** better spent on improving the light-water reactors presently in use. The funds could also be used to create a $670-million-per-year research and development program for nuclear power as well as to determine the best fuel cycle over the course of the next several decades. Finally, the global expansion of nuclear power plants should be enabled by some form of leasing program for the uranium fuel rods—one up for renewal every decade or so

"**For the next several decades in the U.S. the once-through fuel cycle using light-water reactors is the preferred option,"** said M.I.T. physicist and report co-chair Ernest Moniz at its release on September 16 in Washington, D.C. "Light-water reactors are the workhorse, and there's a lot we can do to improve [them]." The U.S. employs 104 light-water reactors to generate 20 percent of its electricity today; the reactors moderate uranium fission and the heat it produces with water, which is also boiled into steam to turn an electricity-generating turbine.

M.I.T. nuclear engineer Charles Forsberg, another co-chair of the report, noted that a typical light-water reactor in the U.S. needs 200 metric tons of mined uranium resulting in 20 metric tons of uranium fuel per year. All this uranium represents as little as 2 percent of the final cost of the electricity from that nuclear power plant. Therefore, **even if uranium prices doubled or more, the impact on electricity prices would be minimal.**

The M.I.T. report predicts that **even if the world's fleet of more than 400 nuclear power plants grew to be 4,000 such plants that then operated for a century, the cost of the electricity from those facilities would rise by a mere 1 percent as a result of the increased demand for uranium**. "**There's no shortage of uranium that might constrain future commitments to build new nuclear plants for much of the century**," Forsberg said. This also argues against alternate fissile fuels such as thorium. "What do you get by complicating the fuel cycle by looking at thorium when we have plenty of uranium?" asked M.I.T. nuclear engineer and report co-chair Mujid Kazimi.

***Reprocessing can’t come online before peak uranium hits***

**Meacher 08** – Michael Meacher MP is a former environment minister. The Guardian (London), 5-7-08, Society: Environment: Bad reactions: The figures just don't stack up for the argument that new nuclear power stations will ensure a secure and sustainable energy source, Lexis, jj

The second favoured Generation IV candidate is the sodium-cooled fast reactor system (SFR). **The idea here is that as the supply of natural uranium declines, it is replaced by a plutonium-based fuel that is incrementally augmented by fresh plutonium in a repetitive cycle, providing claims of sustainability**. It is envisaged that there is a gain in the plutonium in a surrounding "blanket" of uranium 238 over and above the plutonium consumed in the reaction, with a doubling time of 15 to 20 years.

Again **there are two key problems**. It is a burner reactor, not a breeder, so that while reducing waste management problems, **it does not provide for sustainability**. Second, **even if fast reactors of this kind could be successfully deployed - a big if - the doubling time of 15 to 20 years would require supplies of natural uranium to be maintained for decades, if not centuries, until the fleet of "once-through" reactors can be progressively replaced. And the uranium simply is not available for that timespan.**

#### Deterrence high

Acton, Perkovich & Goldschmidt-associate, director and sr associate in Nonprolif Program @ Carnegie Endowment-and Goldschmidt-2009 (James, George & Pierre, “Defending U.S. Leadership on Disarmament,” Proliferation Analysis, July 7, 2009 <http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23354>, Kel)

Senator Kyl and Mr. Perle paint a picture of a nuclear-weapons infrastructure in crisis. While we—and, more importantly, President Obama—share their aim of maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear weapons exist, there is room for disagreement about whether an urgent modernization program is required. Science-based "stockpile stewardship" has been effective to date at ensuring the viability of existing US nuclear weapons. What is needed is an unhurried and sober analysis of exactly what is required to ensure that the US nuclear arsenal remains safe and reliable—exactly what the Obama administration is doing.

***( ) No impact --- conventional deterrence solves***

**Perkovich 9**  
(Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on US Nuclear Policy, “Extended Deterrence on the way to a nuclear free world” International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009, pg. [www.icnnd.org/research/Perkovich \_Deterrence.pdf](http://www.icnnd.org/research/Perkovich%20_Deterrence.pdf))

**The most credible** and perhaps least dangerous **way to assure allies of U.S. commitments to defend them is to station U.S. conventional forces on allied territories**, as is already the case in original NATO states and in Japan and South

Korea. **With U.S. conventional forces in harm’s way, an adversary attacking a U.S. ally would draw the U.S. into the conflict with greater certainty than if nuclear weapons were directly and immediately implicated**. Indeed, the greater credibility that U.S. conventional forces bring to extended deterrence is one reason why Poland has been keen to have U.S. missile defense personnel based on Polish soil. **Were U.S. personnel attacked, the U.S. would respond forcefully. Arguably the best way to strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence would be to stress that conventional capabilities of the U.S. and its allies alone are sufficient to defeat all foreseeable adversaries in any scenario** other than nuclear war. And as long as adversaries can threaten nuclear war, the U.S. will deploy nuclear weapons to deter that threat. Of course, basing U.S. conventional forces on allied territory also invites controversy in many places, including Japan. Such controversies are much less intense than would flow from proposals to base nuclear weapons, but they point to the fundamental underlying political-psychological challenge of extended deterrence. Allies want the protection that the U.S. can provide, and worry about abandonment, but they also don’t want to be implicated in U.S. policies that could entrap them in conflicts not entirely of their making. This tension is the heart of the extended deterrence challenge. To repeat, **rather than focusing on nuclear weapons, the U.S. and its allies should concentrate on building cooperation and confidence in overall political-security strategies in each region**. Indeed, it is worthwhile to honestly consider whether in Northeast Asia and CentralEurope and Turkey the recently expressed concerns over the future credibility of extended U.S. nuclear deterrence is a proxy for deeper concerns that are more difficult to express. For example, in Poland, Russia’s rhetoric and foreign policy, including the conflict with Georgia, elicit private worries that NATO would not actually risk confrontation with Russia to defend Poland against Russian bullying. Can NATO as a collection of 26 states with diverse interests and capabilities be relied upon stand up forcefully in behalf of Poland (and other new NATO states)? Doubts about the answer to this question at least partially explain why Poland has sought special guarantees from the U.S. **It is not clear that focusing on the nuclear element of extended deterrence in this situation helps produce policies and capabilities that actually would deter or dissuade Russia from bellicosity.** **The types of scenarios in which Russia might bully Poland are not likely to include credible threats of Russian coercion that would make countervailing use of nuclear weapons realistic or desirable. Indeed, raising the specter of nuclear threats could undermine the credibility of extended deterrence because allied states**, including the American public, **would probably become alarmed in ways that would weaken resolve to push back firmly against Russian pressure. This resembles the credibility problems of extended nuclear deterrence during the Cold War.**

# Round 6 Neg V NU MP

## 1NC

### CP

***Text: The fifty state governments and the District of Columbia should …***

#### create a prize system for electricity production of space solar power in the United States.

***The fifty states should setup “Green Banks” as per our Center for American Progress evidence. Any energy project financing as a result of the counterplan should come from these “Green Banks”.***

***States can take the lead on clean energy***

SARAH **LASKOW**, Reporter, Good Environment, “As Washington Backs Off Clean Energy, States Are Filling the Void”, Jan 20th 20**12**, http://www.good.is/post/as-washington-backs-off-clean-energy-states-are-filling-the-void/

President Obama released his first campaign ad this week, which touts his credits on clean energy. But while the president has gone further toward supporting clean energy than any other environmental policy, the federal policies that were hustling wind and solar projects into existence have expired under his watch. **Renewable-energy advocacy groups are** pushing to reinstate those incentives, but they're also **shifting focus to the states**: **The Solar Energy Industries Association**, the industry’s lead trade group, **recently merged with the state-focused Solar Alliance to beef up its expertise** on the kaleidoscope of policies emerging from legislatures across the country. As a group, **states are already doing more to support clean energy development than the federal government ever dreamed of**. At the end of 2010, all but four states (Alabama, Missisippi, Tennessee, and Idaho) had approved a clean-energy policy of one kind or another. For states looking to increase their clean energy potential, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory advises using "suites of policies applied in succession” [PDF], with lower-cost strategies coming first. In other words, start small, with projects that will prove their worth quickly, then scale up as governments and citizens become more comfortable with green technology. **There are three major areas in which state governments have a chance to make a significant impact in the clean-energy sphere without needing help from Congress**. Standards. **State governments have the power to mandate certain outcomes. In clean energy, the two most important requirements for states to enforce are building codes and renewable-portfolio standards**. Building codes can require certain levels of energy efficiency in new construction, for instance, which can lock in energy savings over the decades-long lifespan of a building. Renewable portfolio standards require utilities to source a fixed percentage of their power from renewable sources by set deadlines. Connections. Renewable energy installations aren’t much use unless they connect back to the grid, so states need rules for distributed energy sources like rooftop solar to connect back to the grid. **Regulations** like these **also make it possible for the owners of distributed-energy sources to sell power back to the grid or receive credit on their energy bills for the power they contributed**. Money. **In the end, though, growing clean energy means building more renewable power projects, which requires financing. States have such a range of programs in place**—**including grants, rebates, loans, and loan guarantees**—**that researchers looking at state-level policies have had a difficult time deducing which ones are working best.** The Brookings Institution released a report this month advocating creation of **state clean energy funds** to support individual projects. Brookings sees these funds **as a potential engine of innovation, too, funding clean-energy startups and cutting-edge research and development.** **While the federal government backs off from its support of clean energy, state policies like these are increasingly essential for the industry’s continued growth. State-level regulations have a trickle-down effect,** too: **It’s easier for local governments to push for clean energy in states with strong frameworks**. Of course, that would be true for federal level policies, too—while it's heartening that states are taking initiative, they would be able to achieve more with some increased leadership from Washington.

### DA

#### Comprehensive immigration reform is top of the docket and will pass --- Obama’s PC key

Grant 12/29 David Grant | The Christian Science Monitor | Dec 29, 2012, Alaska Dispatch, US immigration reform: Is 'amnesty' a possibility for illegal immigrants now?, <http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/us-immigration-reform-amnesty-possibility-illegal-immigrants-now>, jj

The momentum of President Obama's resounding victory in November's election – with a big push from Latinos and other minority groups – has catapulted immigration policy to the top of Washington's 2013 agenda, making reform not only possible but also likely.

The shift in the political conversation has been so dramatic that even a pathway to citizenship for some of the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States – long rejected out of hand by most Republicans and some Democrats – could be part of the deal.

The task is momentous. It involves weighing the wishes of industries from agriculture to high-tech, as well as the sensitivities of opening the door to immigrant workers at a time when unemployment remains high.

The past only reinforces the potential difficulties ahead. In 1986, Republicans felt betrayed when Democrats stripped the enforcement provisions from a bill that offered citizenship to some 3 million illegal immigrants. By 2005, the issue had become so politically toxic to conservatives that they blocked President George W. Bush's push for a new round of immigration reform.

Yet with Election 2012 highlighting the electoral consequences of America's changing demographics, the next year appears to be ripe for compromise. How reforms might take shape could be a major point of contention between the parties, but lawmakers on both sides suddenly see an opportunity for what could be their most expansive achievement of 2013.

"It has to be in 2013," says Rep. Raúl Labrador (R) of Idaho, an immigration lawyer who thundered into Congress in the tea party wave of 2010. "If we wait until 2014, it's going to be election time. And you know how efficient we are here during election time."

Recent weeks have seen a flurry of activity on Capitol Hill. In the Senate, a "Gang of Eight" – led by longtime immigration reformers Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York and Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina – has added freshman Sens. Michael Bennett (D) of Colorado and Mike Lee (R) of Utah, while potential 2016 presidential aspirant Sen. Marco Rubio (R) of Florida leads his own initiative.

Members of the House have seen movement, too. "One thing clearly has changed," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D) of Illinois, the lawmaker who co-wrote a 2005 comprehensive immigration reform measure with now Sen.-elect Jeff Flake (R) of Arizona. "Nobody is talking about self-deportation. Nobody is talking about how [Arizona's controversial immigration law] should be the standard applied across the land. Nobody is talking about vetoing the DREAM Act," which offers a path to citizenship for some young undocumented immigrants.

"We are having wonderful conversations," Representative Gutierrez says.

That more moderate tone from the GOP is what the November election has wrought.

***Clean energy sucks Obama’s PC***

**Cohen 11** (Steven Cohen, Executive director, Columbia University’s Earth Institute, 4-4-11, Huffington Post, A Plea for Presidential Leadership on Sustainable Energy <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-cohen/a-plea-for-presidential-l_b_844300.html>, jj)

When President Obama ran for President, it seemed to me that he really understood the need to transition our economy from fossil fuels to renewable energy. After eight years of Dick Cheney's Texas oil industry energy policy, it was a relief to hear Obama's perspective. As the campaign evolved, and certainly **once he took office, the President decided that political expedience required that he favor nuclear power and deep sea oil drilling**. My guess is that he is now a little less enthusiastic about these technologies. In fact, **every so often he resumes his rhetorical push for renewable energy.**

The President inherited an economic disaster that by necessity, dominated the agenda of his first two years in office. With the economy beginning to pick up steam, **the BP oil disaster and the Japanese nuclear catastrophe are increasing the demand for President's leadership on energy. But so far, we haven't seen much. A new energy policy is urgently needed**, and it must be influenced by an updated assessment of the risks of energy development after our experiences in Japan and the Gulf of Mexico.

**Instead of a massive national mobilization for renewable energy, we got a "Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future" from the White House**. **The blueprint starts with the typical rhetoric about expanding the domestic production of fossil fuels**. The big news in that plan is that coal is omitted in order to "expand safe and responsible domestic oil and gas development and production." The other elements of the plan include building more fuel efficient vehicles and encouraging more energy efficient buildings. Toward the end of the blueprint, they get around to "innovating our way to a clean energy future." This part of the blueprint includes the goal of generating 80% of our electricity from clean energy sources by 2035. The Obama energy plan provides a number of déjà vu moments. They really are rounding up the usual suspects.

**The problem is that the Administration assigns a lower priority to energy and environment than to the economy, health care, and our military engagements**. While sustainable energy could be a huge boost for the economy, **the American political right is unwilling to invest government money in R & D and will not allow tax policies that favor renewable energy. All of that could be overcome with Presidential leadership, but I do not get the sense that the President really cares about these issues. Until he does, I don't think anything will change.**

I hope it won't take another local disaster to move this issue up on the political agenda. As the news from Japan's damaged Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plants turns from very bad to even worse, one can't help but be reminded of the slow motion disaster of the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. All the elements are there: assurances that the technology was manageable, the sudden lethal accident, a clean-up effort characterized by trial and error and unproven technologies. Let's hope the next energy disaster isn't the contamination of a city's water supply as a result of hydrofracking for natural gas.

Our inability to manage technology and our extreme need for energy leads to technological failures. The irony is that the only way to solve these problems is through the application of other technologies. Dismantling the **energy** based economy **is not politically feasible**. There is little question that along with the wondrous benefits of modern technology we face substantial risks. There is also little question that people are willing to tolerate those risks in order to obtain the benefits of technology. We know that we cannot live in a world without risk, but the issue is what type of risk? What is the probability of risk and what its possible scope and intensity? All risk is not created equal.

Every time you put your key in your car ignition and start to drive, you know you are risking an accident. You take steps to deal with the risk. To reduce the probability of risk, you might avoid icy roads. To reduce the potential scope of an accident you might use your seat belt and turn down that shot of tequila someone offers you "for the road," However, even a horrific auto accident is unlikely to result in massive death and destruction. While some of the impacts of a crash may well be irreversible, most will fade from view fairly quickly.

By definition, the technologies with the greatest potential negative impacts are large scale and capital intensive like most of the power plants that generate electricity. These plants are vestiges of the 20th century era of heavy industry. They are built on the management notion of "economy of scale." Today, inexpensive communication and information technologies allow you to build supply chains and production processes utilizing many organizations located in many places. We have done this in a number of business operations but not energy. It is possible to conceive of a decentralized energy system, but we have not yet built one. Distributed electric generation utilizing small scale power generators managed by smart grid technologies can ensure that electric generation capacity is less prone to breakdown due to the failure of a single generation source.

**The amount of investment in capital intensive energy generation has resulted in a powerful set of economic interests that have long prevented America from addressing its critical energy problems. These established interests define energy reality. New technologies that require R & D and other incentives to compete with low tech fossil fuels are defined as infeasible and inadequate**. **The terms of debate are controlled by these interests and reinforced by the ideology of the free market.** This is an amazing argument given the tax breaks and other government funded incentives long enjoyed by the fossil fuel industry.

**While there is a clear need for the U.S. government to implement an activ**e and if you'll excuse the pun, energetic **energy policy, the political calculus in Washington is moving in the opposite direction. The House Republicans are so clueless about the need for sustainable economic development, that they are working overtime to use the budget process to prevent EPA from regulating greenhouse gasses and other air and water pollutants**. And **the President seems reluctant to push energy and environment and provide meaningful, sustained leadership**. This is not a new story. But I for one hoped for more. I still do.

***CIR solves Latin American relations and prevents massive instability***

Robert **Gittelson** (Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Policy) 20**09** “The Centrists Against the Ideologues: What Are the Falsehoods That Divide Americans on the Issue of Comprehensive Immigration Reform?” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1400764>

However, the above list of security enhancements is only a part of the overall security ramifications of CIR. For example, as everyone—including our enemies all over the world—knows, our military **manpower** is strained **to the limit. Our troops are on a seemingly endless loop of deployment**s, with no imminent relief in sight. Our **military recruiting officers are struggling to meet the vital new quotas for fresh servicemen and women**, and scandals have started to come to light of instances where we have waived or lowered our induction standards.28 We are also offering record high bonus inducements to lure potential recruits to join the armed forces.29 CIR can really help us **in this regard,** with the **potential** addition of millions of military age**, able-bodied** men and women**, should CIR allow them to legalize their status.** This would not only increase the **potential** pool of **new** recruits; it would allow the military to **once again** raise standards, and— because of the laws of supply and demand—**they could save much-needed revenue** by lowering the bonuses that they are currently offering due to the short supply of potential seamen, soldiers, and airmen. The long-term benefit to our country through the addition of these potential recruits is that these young men and women would receive valuable training for advancement in life in whatever career path they should choose. They would be able to take advantage of the laws governing accelerated citizenship for immigrants who serve in the military, and, of course, our country—and by extension **the entire world**—**would be safer because of this** provision of **CIR**. In the alternative, should we fail to pass CIR**,** and instead opt to deport or force attrition on these millions of economic refugees through an enforcement-only approach to our current undocumented immigrant difficulties, what would be the net result? Forgetting for now the devastating effect on our own economy, **and the worldwide reproach and loss of moral authority** that we would frankly deserve should we act so callously and thoughtlessly, there is another important political imperative to our **passing** CIR that affects our national security, and the security and political stability of our neighbors in our hemisphere. That is the very real threat of communism and/or socialism. First of all, the primary reason why millions of undocumented economic refugees migrated to the United States is because the economies of their home countries were unable to support them. They escaped extreme poverty and oppression, and risked literally everything they had, including their lives and their freedom, to come to this country to try to work hard and support themselves and their families. Deporting our illegal immigrant population back to **primarily** Latin America would boost the communist **and socialist** movements in that **part of our** hemisphere, and if the anti-immigrationists only understood that fact, they might re-think their “line in the sand” position on what they insist on calling “amnesty.” Communism thrives where hope is lost. **The economies of Latin American nations are struggling to barely reach a level of meager subsistence for the population that has remained at home;** Mexico, for example, has already lost 14% of their able-bodied workers to U.S. migration.30 Without the billions of dollars in remissions **from these nations’ expatriates working in the United States that go back to help support their remaining family members**, the economies of many of these countries**, most of whom are in fact our allies,** would **certainly** collapse, or at least deteriorate to dangerously unstable levels. The addition of millions of unemployed and frustrated deported people who would go to the end of the theoretical unemployment lines of these already devastated economies would **surely** cause massive unrest and anti-American sentiment. The issue of comprehensive immigration reform is not simply a domestic issue. In our modern global economy, everything that we do, as the leaders of that global economy, affects the entire world, and most especially our region of the world. If we were to naively initiate actions that would lead to the destabilization of **the** Mexican and **many Central and** South American governments, while at the same time **causing serious harm to our own economy** (but I digress . . .), it would most assuredly lead to disastrous economic and political consequences. By the way, I’m not simply theorizing here. In point of fact, over the past few years, eight countries in Latin America have elected leftist leaders. Just last year, Guatemala swore in their first leftist president in more than fifty years, Alvaro Colom.31 He joins a growing list. Additional countries besides Guatemala, Venezuela,32 and Nicaragua33 that have sworn in extreme left wing leaders in Latin America recently include Brazil,34 Argentina,35 Bolivia,36 Ecuador,37 and Uruguay.38 This phenomenon is not simply a coincidence; it is a trend. **The political infrastructure of Mexico is under extreme pressure** from the left.39 Do we really want a leftist movement on our southern border? If our political enemies such as the communists Chavez in Venezuela and Ortega in Nicaragua **are** call**ing** the shots in Latin America, what kind of cooperation can we expect **in our battle to secure our southern border**?

***The impact is global great power wars***

**Rochin ‘94**  
Rochin, Professor of Political Science, ‘94 James, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College, Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America, pp. 130-131

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. **Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region** – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – **were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere**. Hence, **the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region.** Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, **instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena** – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that **such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war**. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

### DA

#### 100 dollar per barrel oil inevitable now – benefits oil exporters economies

IMF 11/11/12 (The International Monetary Fund, “Divergent Economic Performance Continues Across the Middle East”, Nov 11 12, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/CAR110912A.htm>)

Oil exporters’ economies are buoyant The region’s oil-exporting countries are expected to post solid growth in 2012, largely on account of Libya’s better-than-expected post-conflict recovery. In the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, growth remains robust, supported by expansionary fiscal policies and accommodative monetary conditions, but is expected to slow from 7½ percent in 2011 to 3¾ percent in 2013 as oil production reaches a plateau. The price of oil is expected to remain above $100 per barrel in 2012–13. As a result, the oil exporters’ combined current account surplus is anticipated to remain near its historic high of about $400 billion in 2012 (see Chart 1). This has helped governments to respond to growing social demands by increasing expenditure on wages and salaries, which rose dramatically in most oil exporters in recent years.

***Link timeframe is quick---the plan lowers the expected future demand for oil—causes oil prices to plummet***

**Feldstein, ‘8** - Martin Feldstein, 7/1/2008. Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan, is a professor at Harvard and a member of The Wall Street Journal's board of contributors. “We Can Lower Oil Prices Now,” The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121486800837317581.html?mod=opinion\_main\_commentaries.

Unlike perishable agricultural products, oil can be stored in the ground. So **when will an owner of oil reduce production or increase inventories instead of selling his oil and converting the proceeds into investible cash?** **A simplified answer is that he will keep the oil in the ground if its price is expected to rise faster than the interest rate that could be earned on the money obtained from selling the oil.** The actual price of oil may rise faster or slower than is expected, but **the decision to sell (or hold) the oil depends on the expected price rise**. There are of course considerations of risk, and of the impact of price changes on long-term consumer behavior, that complicate the oil owner's decision – and therefore the behavior of prices. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (the OPEC cartel), with its strong pricing power, still plays a role. But **the fundamental insight is that owners of oil will adjust their production and inventories until the price of oil is expected to rise at the rate of interest, appropriately adjusted for risk.** **If the price of oil is expected to rise faster, they'll keep the oil in the ground. In contrast, if the price of oil is not expected to rise as fast as the rate of interest, the owners will extract more and invest the proceeds.** The relationship between future and current oil prices implies that **an expected change in the future price of oil will have an immediate impact on the current price of oil.** Thus, when oil producers concluded that the demand for oil in China and some other countries will grow more rapidly in future years than they had previously expected, they inferred that **the future price of oil would be higher than they had previously believed.** They responded by reducing supply and raising the spot price enough to bring the expected price rise back to its initial rate. Hence, **with no change in the current demand for oil, the expectation of a greater future demand and a higher future price caused the current price to rise.** Similarly, credible reports about the future decline of oil production in Russia and in Mexico implied a higher future global price of oil – and that also required an increase in the current oil price to maintain the initial expected rate of increase in the price of oil. Once this relation is understood, **it is easy to see how news stories, rumors and industry reports can cause substantial fluctuations in current prices – all without anything happening to current demand or supply.** Of course, **a rise in the spot price of oil triggered by a change in expectations about future prices will cause a decline in the current quantity of oil that consumers demand.** If current supply and demand were initially in balance, the OPEC countries and other oil producers would respond by reducing sales to bring supply into line with the temporary reduction in demand. **A rise in the expected future demand for oil thus causes a current decline in the amount of oil being supplied.** This is what happened as the Saudis and others cut supply in 2007. Now here is the good news. **Any policy that causes the expected future oil price to fall can cause the current price to fall**, or to rise less than it would otherwise do. In other words, **it is possible to bring down today's price of oil with policies that will have their physical impact on oil demand or supply only in the future.** For example, **increases in government subsidies to develop technology that will make future cars more efficient, or tighter standards that gradually improve the gas mileage** of the stock of cars, **would lower the future demand for oil and therefore the price of oil today**. Similarly, **increasing the expected future supply of oil would also reduce today's price. That fall in the current price would induce an immediate rise in oil consumption that would be matched by an increase in supply from the OPEC producers and others with some current excess capacity or available inventories**. **Any steps that can be taken now to increase the future supply of oil, or reduce the future demand for oil in the U.S. or elsewhere, can therefore lead both to lower prices and increased consumption today.**

***Drop in oil demand causes Russian economic instability --- risks nuclear war***

**Miller 10**—assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma (Gregory D., April 2010, © Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly 33:2, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence,” http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr\_Miller.pdf)

**Russia is another** potential **danger spot because it is the only nuclear state**, at least for now, **that has significant revenue from the sale of oil, roughly** 8—**20 percent of its GDP**. Losing that income will have less dramatic effects on Russia than on many OPEC states more heavily reliant on oil sales, at least partly because of recent attempts to diversify the Russian economy. **Its economy**, however, **is still too fragile to handle a major drop in demand for oil**. **Given the existing tension between Russia and states such as Georgia and Ukraine, neither the United States nor Russia’s neighbors can afford the risk of a nuclear Russia suffering economic instability**.19

***Extinction***

**FILGER 2009** (Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

**In Russia** historically, **economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major** industrialized **economies**. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, **Medvedev and Putin**, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, **are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability**, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. **Should the Russian economy deteriorate** to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, **the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis**. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, **Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability** to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that **a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing** social and political **upheaval**. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. **During the years** Boris **Yeltsin ruled** Russia, **security forces** responsible for **guarding the** nation’s **nuclear arsenal went without pay** for months at a time, **leading to fears that** desperate **personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain?** It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### K

#### Energy Policy is a product of capitalism’s attempt to increase productivity and profit. This allows for exploitative working conditions and leads to extinction.

ICC ’11 (Nuclear Energy, Capitalism and Communism, August 16, 2011, http://en.internationalism.org/wr/347/nuclear)

The revolution in the form and quantity of energy available to humanity underpinned the industrial revolution and opened the door from the realm of want to that of plenty. But this revolution was driven by the development of capitalism whose purpose is not the satisfaction of human needs but the increase of capital based on the appropriation of surplus value produced by an exploited working class. Energy is used to drive the development of productivity but it is also a cost of production. It is part of the constant capital alongside raw materials, machines and factories and, as such, tends to increase in relation to the variable capital that is the source of capitalism’s profits. It is this that dictates capitalism’s attitude to energy.

Capitalism has no regard for the use of energy, for the destruction of finite resources, other than as a cost of production. Increased productivity tends to require increased energy, so the capitalists (other than those in the oil industry) are driven to try and reduce the cost of this energy. On the one hand this results in the profligate use of energy for irrational ends, such as transporting similar commodities back and forth across the world and the ceaseless multiplication of commodities that meet no real human need but serve only as a means to extract and realise surplus value. On the other, it leads to the denial of access to energy and to the products of energy for millions of humans who lack the money to be of interest to the capitalists. This is illustrated in Nigeria where Shell pumps out billions of dollars worth of oil while the local people go without or risk their lives by trying to illegally tap the oil from the pipeline. The price is also paid by those working in the energy industries in lives lost and bodies maimed or poisoned and by the environment and all that lives in it, from the polluted, toxic waters of the Thames that characterised 19th century London to the warming of the globe that threatens the future of humanity today.

#### The aff is wasted energy – fighting particular battles without changing the way the economy works means nothing really changes – the aff just obscures the logic of capitalism

Zizek, ’99 (Slavoj, Senior Researcher and professor at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject, page 352-355)

The big news of today’s post-political age of the ‘end of ideology’ is thus the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy: the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to responsible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the ‘cultural’ issues of religious, sexual, ethnic and other way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made. In short, the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital’s freedom, the subordinated of the process of production to social control – the radical *repoliticization of the economy*. That is to say: if the problem with today’s post-politics (‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today’s post-politics cannot attain the properly political dimension of universality; because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization. The domain of global capitalist market relations in the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of ‘identity politics’ and other postmodern forms of politicization: all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues (gay rights, ecology, ethnic minorities…), all this incessant activity of fluid, shifting identities, of building multiple *ad hoc* coalitions, and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something – what *really matters* – will *not* be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized. 35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, it is much more crucial to focus on what *remains the same* in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital. The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodiments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom – that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature – today’s subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life.

#### Vote neg on ethics - resisting this reliance on economic evaluation is the ultimate ethical responsibility

Zizek and Daly 2004

(Slavoj, professor of philosophy at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana, and Glyn, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, Conversations with Zizek, page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### The alternative is to withdraw from the ideology of capital. Capitalism only survives because we believe it is a truth claim.

Johnston ’04 (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Žižek’s recent writings isn’t a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Žižek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance ( Žižek, 2001d, pp 22–23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Žižek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of ‘‘magic,’’ that is, the belief in money’s social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance’s powers. The ‘‘external’’ obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, ‘‘internally’’ believe in it – capitalism’s life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others’ belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism’s frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic’s fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Žižek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing). Or, the more disquieting possibility to entertain is that some people today, even if one succeeds in exposing them to the underlying logic of their position, might respond in a manner resembling that of the Judas-like character Cypher in the film The Matrix (Cypher opts to embrace enslavement by illusion rather than cope with the discomfort of dwelling in the ‘‘desert of the real’’): faced with the choice between living the capitalist lie or wrestling with certain unpleasant truths, many individuals might very well deliberately decide to accept what they know full well to be a false pseudo-reality, a deceptively comforting fiction (‘‘Capitalist commodity fetishism or the truth? I choose fetishism’’).

### Solvency

#### The Plan will, if it goes on schedule (unlike every other NASA mission) occur in 2050 at best.

Foust ’07 [Jeff Foust, Editor and Publisher of the Space Review, 8-13-2007, “A Renaissance for Solar Space Power” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/931/1]

Smith made it clear, though, that he’s not looking for a quick fix that will suddenly make solar power satellites feasible in the near term. “If I can close this deal on space-based solar power, it’s going to take a long time,” he said. “The horizon we’re looking at is 2050 before we’re able to do something significant.” The first major milestone, he said, would be a small demonstration satellite that could be launched in the next eight to ten years that would demonstrate power beaming from GEO. However, he added those plans could change depending on developments of various technologies that could alter the direction space solar power systems would go. “That 2050 vision, what that architecture will look like, is carved in Jell-O.

#### Manufacturing Solar-Powered Cells leads to the emission of greenhouse gases

**Decker ’08 [Kris de Decker, creater of low-tech magazine, freelance journalist, 3-20-2008, “The Ugly Side of Solar Panels”, http://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2008/03/the-ugly-side-o.html]**

Solar panels don’t come falling out of the sky – they have to be manufactured. Similar to computer chips, this is a dirty and energy-intensive process. First, raw materials have to be mined: quartz sand for silicon cells, metal ore for thin film cells. Next, these materials have to be treated, following different steps (in the case of silicon cells these are purification, crystallization and wafering). Finally, these upgraded materials have to be manufactured into solar cells, and assembled into modules. All these processes produce air pollution and heavy metal emissions, and they consume energy - which brings about more air pollution, heavy metal emissions and also greenhouse gases.

**Plan is all hype – its impossible**

The Space Review 10, Monday, June 7, 2010, (Dwayne A. Day, Blinded by the light, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1641/1>)

Fortunately for us, there aren’t too many lasting cultural legacies of the 1970s. The seventies, well, sucked. The music—save for Led Zeppelin and Floyd—[was generally lousy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manfred_Mann%27s_Earth_Band). And other cultural artifacts, such as the clothes, made brief reappearances before vanishing into the pit of evil from which they first emerged. However, in the past few years another cultural echo of the 1970s has arisen once again, the concept of space solar power. The idea of building vast solar power satellites and beaming the energy to Earth predates the 1970s, but it developed its following in that decade. There were several factors contributing to this, most of them directly or indirectly linked to each other. They included the environmental movement, the Oil Crisis, and a government study. But at the time, space solar power seemed to answer a cultural, ideological, even spiritual need among a small segment of people. The early 1970s was a period of gloom and doom, with some prominent academics rather stupidly claiming that humanity [would soon exhaust most of its energy and mineral resources and virtually destroy itself](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Limits_to_Growth). Such defeatism annoyed a small group of people who had also been impressed by the Apollo program and who believed that space offered infinite resources and infinite energy. But space solar power also had an appeal to people who saw the exploits of the Apollo astronauts and thought that they would like to do that too. Gerard K. O’Neill provided a justification for ordinary people to live and work in space—they would build and operate solar power satellites. Thousands of people were taken in by this idea. And then over the next decade or so they saw no progress towards making it happen. The Space Shuttle did not provide the cheap access to space that was required, and so the concept of solar power satellites lost what little support it had and became just another unfunded fringe idea. It remains an unfunded fringe idea to this day. But like flare pants and wide ties, it has made a bit of a comeback. The specific reasons are eerily similar to the ones that made it briefly popular in the1970s: a renewed environmental movement thanks in part to Al Gore, high gasoline prices—over $4 a gallon in 2008—and a government-sponsored study. That study, produced by the National Security Space Office in 2007, seems to have been the spark that reignited the fumes of this long-dormant community. But the community failed to recognize that an unfunded study produced by an office that has zero clout within the national security space field in no way represented Pentagon endorsement of the idea of space solar power. (Proof: DoD isn’t building solar powersats.) The more general reason that space solar power has reemerged is that just like in the 1970s, space solar power fills a cultural, ideological, and yes, spiritual need among a certain type of person. It **has nothing to do with the concept suddenly becoming technically or economically feasible, or gaining any credibility within the energy sector**. Last month two groups held solar energy conferences separated by one week, 1700 miles, and a million light years. The first was[SOLAR 2010](http://www.ases.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18&Itemid=147), the annual conference of the American Solar Energy Society held in Phoenix, Arizona. The second was the [“First National Space Society Space Solar Power Symposium”](http://isdc.nss.org/2010/?page=space_solar_power) held at the International Space Development Conference in Chicago, Illinois. The Space Solar Power Symposium featured approximately three dozen presentations on the subject, including individuals from Japan and India. The presentation topics ranged from the mundane (“Prospects for microwave wireless power transmission”) to the polemic (“Why Space Solar Power is the Answer and the ONLY Answer to Our Long Term Energy Needs”). But if you went to SOLAR 2010 a week earlier, you would have noticed something rather striking. Despite the attendance of hundreds of people, numerous companies, and the presentation of hundreds of technical papers; despite the presence of the United States’ best experts on energy policy, energy transmission, energy generation, and solar power technology—there were no presentations on space solar power. Think about that for a moment. What does it say about space solar power? What it says is that space solar power is a fringe idea that is **not even taken seriously within the niche field of solar power generation**. What it also says is that the space solar power community doesn’t play with the big boys. It’s a community that talks to itself, that seeks the comfort of like-minded individuals, and doesn’t even try to sell its message to the audience most likely to give it a fair hearing.

#### SSP fails --- can’t be cost competitive

Txchnologist 4/4/11, “Space Race: Will Space-Based Solar Take Off?” online

It’s not an unheard-of idea: Government and private industry have been doing something similar for decades with communications satellites.

“The science of space-based solar power is done. We know how to do it,” said U.S. Air Force Colonel M.V. “Coyote” Smith, who is one of the military’s leading authorities on the idea. “The question is, can we do it commercially at an affordable price?”

Smith directed a [2007 study](http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/nsso.htm) for the National Security Space Office (it is now known as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space), which concluded that the U.S. government should facilitate the creation of space-based solar power and become an early tester of the technology.

Smith concedes that space-based power requires researchers to make progress on technological challenges that have not yielded in decades. The cost of lifting thousands of kilograms of equipment into orbit makes space solar almost prohibitively expensive right off the bat. In 2008, [it cost about $21,000](http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awst/2010/05/03/AW_05_03_2010_p34-222909.xml&headline=Study%20Finds%20Launch%20Costs%20Dropping&channel=space) to launch a kilogram of payload into space, though the price has dropped steadily and space solar enthusiasts point to innovations by space entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and Richard Branson as evidence that [prices will drop](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26932813/ns/technology_and_science-space/).

### Heg

***1) Heg high and sustainable now – overwhelming power***

**Tufts Daily 2-23-11** (Prashanth Parameswaran, master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, writer for the New Strait Times, Strait Times and China Post, and former CSIS intern, “America is not in decline” <http://www.tuftsdaily.com/op-ed/prashanth-parameswaran-the-asianist-1.2478466>, jj)

I don't. **Very little about "American decline" is real or new. Similar predictions of U.S. decline have surfaced every decade or so** since Washington rebuilt the international system after World War II, from the aftermath of Sputnik in the 1960s to the economic distress of the 1980s. Foreign Policy is also hardly the only peddler of the latest declinism fetish. Everyone from [Newsweek's](http://newsweek.com) Fareed Zakaria to former Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani to American intelligence agencies themselves has parroted a version of it. But every myth has a grain of truth. In this case it's the fact that — God forbid — other powers are rising. Goldman Sachs says China will overtake the U.S. economy by 2027 and that the BRIC nations (**Brazil, Russia, India and China) will emerge as major world players**. But **so what? Other powers have been rising for decades**. **Yet,** to take one statistic**, the American economy in 2004 was the same size relative to the world's total GDP as it was in 1975 — 20 percent.** The real and more useful questions about decline are therefore not who is growing and by how much, but whether emerging powers can dent American power sufficiently and whether the United States will lose the key advantages that have sustained it as the world's sole superpower. **For all the fretting, the United States,** as Mr. Rachman himself admits, **remains the leader across the board. U.S. military power is still unmatched and vastly technologically superior to any other nation. Military spending is almost as much as the rest of the world combined. The American economy dominates futuristic industries like biotechnology and nanotechnology with a potent combination of technological prowess and entrepreneurial flair.** According to China's own Jiao Tong University's rankings, **17 of the world's top 20 universities are American. Millions still flock here to pursue the American Dream, while America's melting pot of cultures bodes well for its exceptional innovative capacity**. Provided the United States continues to encourage immigration and starts controlling its debt, **there is little reason to believe that such a *resilient colossus* will see its vast advantages perish**. **There are also few signs of a "global multipolar system" emerging anytime soon.** Despite doomsday realist predictions, **no country has attempted to balance Washington's hegemony since 1991**. And while the future rise of Asian powers may boost the case for eventual American decline, the truth is that **each of the United States' potential balancers also faces significant challenges going forward. For China, it is the growing disparity between its coastal and inland areas, its physical isolation and the risk that it will get old before it gets rich. For India and the European Union, the challenge will be to painfully negotiate the divergent interests of states in a noisy democratic system. As for Iran, Russia and Venezuela, they are flexing their muscles as proud spoilers, not global powers. It is also quite unlikely that these states will soon form a coalition to confront the United States, given their own divergent interests.** Even China and Russia compete ferociously in Central Asia today. Don't get me wrong. I don't believe we've reached Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," particularly with the slowing of democracy's progress during the last decade. Nor do I think the United States will be able to dominate and dictate terms to others all the time in the future. Still, **I just don't see the irreversible decline in U.S. power and the rise of a new world order that many seem to reflexively accept.**

***5) Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war – conflicts would be small and managable***

Richard **Haas** (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April **2008** “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask\_the\_expert.html

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

***6) Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation***

Carla **Norrlof** (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) **2010** “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 50

Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size, as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers, not just the hegemon, Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods, thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America’s relative decline. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines, so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the revised model (i.e., by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model), the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in, these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous

***Air power fails---history and Libya proves***

**Ramberg, June 6th, 2011** (Bennett, Ph.D., Johns Hopkins; J.D. UCLA, foreign policy analyst in the [Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs](http://www.seattlepi.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=national%2Fpolitico&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Bureau+of+Politico-Military+Affairs%22) at the [Department of State](http://www.seattlepi.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=national%2Fpolitico&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Department+of+State%22) during the [George H.W. Bush](http://www.seattlepi.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=national%2Fpolitico&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22George+H.W.+Bush%22) administration, academic appointments have included positions at Princeton, Stanford and UCLA, Seattle Post Intelligencer, “Why NATO’s air might lacks power” <http://www.seattlepi.com/default/article/Why-NATO-s-air-might-lacks-power-1411125.php>, jj)

NATO is chagrined. Yes, the bombing campaign stopped [Muammar Qadhafi](http://www.seattlepi.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=national%2Fpolitico&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Muammar+Qadhafi%22)'s march on Benghazi. And, yes, it staved off rebel defeats elsewhere, breaking the government's siege on Misurata. But **the alliance's hopes for a quick victory through a mini "shock and awe" failed after months of trying.** Catch me if you can, the dictator taunted NATO in his May 13 radio comment: "I am in a place you cannot reach." **Given NATO's resources, why the failure?** One answer: The colonel is not the blowhard some depicted. That should come as no surprise. Over the decades, Qadhafi proved to be a brutal but deft dictator. He beat back multiple attempts to unseat him. He survived years of isolation following the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. And in 2003, he proved nimble enough to surrender his nascent nuclear program as the quid pro quo for resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States and others. But there remains another reason: **NATO's belief in air power**. **In 1999, the alliance learned** **a** lesson - or, better put, **mislesson - that air power could win wars**. **In** the 11-week **Kosovo** campaign, **air power did** indeed **prevail. NATO hoped the strategy would repeat in North Africa. But the presumption lay on a historic anomaly - with unique caveats - rather than the broader tapestry of air power in history. The result: the Libya stalemate today**. A deeper look at history adds perspective. Air power classically seeks to bend the curve of war toward success. Tactically, it attempts to block adversary gains and provide an additive to ground forces. Strategically, it strives to incite domestic political instability within the adversary's ranks, intimidating the enemy to concede. The Kosovo war included intense NATO bombing subject to a limited objective: the expulsion of Serbian forces from the province. The three-month war included about 10,500 strike missions dropping 12,000 tons of bombs largely flown by the United States under the NATO banner. In addition to military targets, the war destroyed about 50 percent of Serbia's productive capacity. The blow squeezed a nation already reeling in the aftermath of the nearly decadelong Balkan wars. **In the aftermath, some reviewers remained mystified over NATO's air power success.** **After all, no other air campaign** - the dropping of the atomic bomb in World War II excluded - **successfully delivered a knockout blow without an effective ground war**. **The Blitz over Britain in World War II failed. Likewise, the extended bombing of Germany. The fire bombings of Tokyo also stumbled**. **After World War II, other conflicts repeatedly demonstrated the limits of air power**. **In the Cold War's hot wars, air campaigns could only help prevent defeat in Korea. It did not even achieve that in Vietnam. The Soviets found the same in Afghanistan. Israel's 1967 successful air assault on Egypt's air force still required ground forces to win the war. Air power supplemented the 1991 and 2003 wars in Iraq, the Bosnia war and the ongoing war in Afghanistan**. So why did Kosovo prove different? The answer lies less in unconvincing threats of ground intervention or Russia's displeasure with Serbia that some suggest than in the Milosevic regime's conclusion that it could afford to lose the province as long as regime change in Belgrade did not follow. That is not the case in Libya. Despite the [Security Council](http://www.seattlepi.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=national%2Fpolitico&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Security+Council%22)'s humanitarian resolution, the leaders of Britain, France and the United States call for Qadhafi's removal. The repeated bombardment of the Libyan leader's residential compound brings the point home. And the colonel has gotten the message and drawn the logical conclusion: Surrender is not an option. **This places NATO in a quandary. Absent a coup or lucky air strike** that takes out Qadhafi, **success requires what all other wars demanded: a competent, reasonably armed and well-led ground capacity. In the Libya case, this will require time, money, equipment and leadership with far more on-the-ground NATO assistance.** For those who think otherwise, they would do well to recall the conclusion [Johns Hopkins](http://www.seattlepi.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=national%2Fpolitico&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Johns+Hopkins%22) University strategist [Eliot Cohen](http://www.seattlepi.com/?controllerName=search&action=search&channel=national%2Fpolitico&search=1&inlineLink=1&query=%22Eliot+Cohen%22) - the director of the U.S. government's Persian Gulf War evaluation - made in Foreign Affairs in 1994: "**Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment." In Libya, gratification will not suffice**.

### Warming

***1) The environment is resilient but nuclear war turns it***

**Schweickart 10** – David Schweickart 10 is Professor at Loyola University Chicago. He holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics (University of Virginia), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy (Ohio State University). “Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible?” Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 41 (2010) 6739–6752

**It is *not true*** either **that the various ecological crises we are facing will bring about “the end of the world**.” Consider the projections of the Stern Review, the recently released report commissioned by the British Government. If nothing is done, we risk “major disruption to economic and social activity, later in this century and the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and economic depression of the first half of the 20th century.”¶ This is serious. Some **sixty million people died in World War Two. The Stern Review estimates as many as 200 million people could be** permanently **displaced by rising sea level and drought**. But **this is not “the end of the world.” Even if the effects are far worse, resulting in billions of deaths—a highly unlikely scenario**—**there would still be lots of us left**. **If three-quarters of the present population perished, that would still leave us with 1.6 billion people—the population of the planet in 1900.** ¶ **I say this** not to minimize the potentially horrific impact of relentless environmental destruction, but **to caution against exaggeration. We are not talking about thermonuclear war—which could have *extinguish***ed ***us*** as a species. (It still might.) And we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that **millions of people** on the planet right now, **caught up in savage civil wars or terrorized by U.S. bombers** (which dropped some 100,000 lbs. of explosives on a Baghdad neighborhood during one ten-day period in January 2008—the amount the fascists used to level the Basque town of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War), **are faced with conditions more terrible than anyone here is likely to face in his or her lifetime due to environmental degradation.**

***2) No extinction from warming***

**NIPCC 11** – the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, an international panel of nongovernment scientists and scholars, March 8, 2011, “Surviving the Unprecedented Climate Change of the IPCC,” online: http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

On the other hand, they indicate that some **biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change** (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), **and yet biotic communities have remained *remarkably resilient*** (Mayle and Power, 2008) **and in some cases thrived** (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although **the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records."**

Going on to do just that, **Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity**." And **what emerges from those studies**, as they describe it, **"is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another**." And, **most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world."**

In concluding, **the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable *biotic resilience* to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."**

***3) Non-unique --- cooling is the trend***

**Star Tribune**, March 19th, 20**11** (“Jason Lewis: Climate change is natural, and we don’t have the data to predict it” <http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentary/118270544.html>, jj)

All in the name of a [**global warming theory**](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/gore-lecture_en.html) whose fundamental premise **looks weaker every day**. Not long ago, the [Heartland Institute asserted](http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/gleick/detail?entry_id=82761) that **NASA had "been artificially inflating U.S. temperatures by 0.15 degrees Celsius since the year 2000**" and as a result erroneously reported that readings over the last decade "were warmer than the 1930s, when in fact the opposite was true." Eventually, agency officials did recant 1998 as the hottest on U.S. record when the data were reanalyzed showing the pre-greenhouse-gas era year of 1934 to be slightly warmer. **Across the globe, the last few winters have been exceedingly harsh. China has endured its most severe winter in 100 years, snow has fallen in Baghdad, and the U**nited **K**ingdom **just suffered through its coldest December since 1683**, according to figures from the Met Office. **British astrophysicist** David **Whitehouse says that not only have temperatures leveled off since 1998, they may actually be cooling once again**. Of course, that doesn't mean it's so. In 1975, Newsweek cited the scientific consensus (heard that one before?) about the coming danger of global cooling. Temperatures had been declining since 1940 even as carbon dioxide levels rose. Regardless of who is correct, we would do well to remember that cold is far more calamitous for mankind than the purported 0.6 degrees Celsius rise in the last century. Besides, as a growing number of "[climate skeptics](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8694544.stm)" point out, **atmospheric variables tend to mitigate or reverse the effects of greenhouse gases**. **By not accurately accounting for the "negative feedback" of water vapor, ocean currents, ozone, aerosols, volcanoes and, most important, solar output** (as well as the diminishing effects of accumulated greenhouse gases) **global-warming proponents allow themselves to sanctimoniously pronounce that, all things being equal, a rise in CO2 will elicit a rise in temperature**. Of course, all things are never equal. And therein lies the problem. **The global-warming hysteria is based on computer models, not empirical data**, because the records simply don't go back far enough. **If Climategate taught us anything, it's that these models are subject to human manipulation.** **The famous "hockey stick" graph showing rapid warming in the 20th century was thoroughly debunked by Canadian researchers even before the purloined e-mails showed how global warming researchers were desperately trying to "hide the decline" in temperatures**. Which is not to say that the Earth doesn't warm at times and ice doesn't melt in the Arctic. **The Earth warms** (see the Medieval Warm Period), **then it cools** (see the Little Ice Age), **and then it warms and ... well, you get the picture.**

***4) No tipping points***

**IHRR 12** (Institute of Hazard, Risk and Resilience, “Moving beyond ‘the tipping point of climate change,’” 5/4, <http://ihrrblog.org/2012/05/04/moving-beyond-the-tipping-point-of-climate-change/>)

To begin, we are now observing **climate change** solely from the period of **today** or in the relatively recent past, which **is a very small part of what came before it millions of years ago**. Antony Long found the use of tipping point to describe climate change potentially nihilistic or disempowering for thinking about climate change when in fact we should be moving the other way. Also, **tipping points may not necessarily be irreversible which is how climate change is often portrayed**. While less complex than the climate problem ozone depletion was seen as veering towards a tipping point, but **as production of CFCs ceased the ozone layer restored over time.**

***5) Not anthropogenic***

**Bast and Taylor 11** – \*CEO of the Heartland Institute, author of Rebuilding America’s Schools (1990), Why We Spend Too Much on Health Care (1992) Eco-Sanity: A Common-Sense Guide to Environmentalism (1994) Education & Capitalism (2003), Climate Change Reconsidered (2009), and The Patriot’s Toolbox (2010, rev. ed. 2011), \*\* managing editor of Environment & Climate News, Senior Fellow for The Heartland Institute, bachelors degree from Dartmouth College and law degree from the Syracuse University College of Law, (Joseph and James, “Global Warming: Not a Crisis,” The Heartland Institute, 8/2/11, http://heartland.org/ideas/global-warming-not-crisis)

Natural or Man-Made? **The** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change **(IPCC),** an agency of the United Nations, **claims the warming that has occurred since the mid-twentieth century “is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations**” (IPCC, 2007). Many climate scientists disagree with the IPCC on this key issue. As Idso and Singer wrote in 2009, **The IPCC does not apply generally accepted methodologies to determine what fraction of current warming is natural, or how much is caused by the rise in** greenhouse gases (**GHG**). **A comparison of “fingerprints” from best available observations with the results of state-of-the-art GHG models leads to the conclusion that the (human-caused) GHG contribution is minor. This fingerprint evidence, though available, was ignored by the IPCC. The IPCC continues to undervalue the overwhelming evidence that**, on decadal and century-long time scales, **the Sun and associated atmospheric cloud effects are responsible for much of past climate change. It is** therefore **highly likely that the Sun is also a major cause of twentieth-century warming, with anthropogenic GHG making only a minor contribution**. In addition, the IPCC ignores, or addresses imperfectly, other science issues that call for discussion and explanation (Idso and Singer, 2009). Scientists who study the issue say it is impossible to tell if the recent small warming trend is natural, a continuation of the planet’s recovery from the more recent “Little Ice Age,” or unnatural, the result of human greenhouse gas emissions. **Thousands of peer-reviewed articles point to natural sources of climate variability that could explain some or even all of the warming in the second half of the twentieth century** (Idso and Singer, 2009). S. Fred Singer and Dennis Avery **documented natural climate cycles of approximately 1,500 years going back hundreds of thousands of years** (Singer and Avery, second edition 2008). It is clear from climate records that **the Earth was warmer than it is now in recorded human history, before man-made greenhouse gas emissions could have been the cause.** We know enough about how the Earth’s climate works to know that biological and physical processes remove CO2 from the atmosphere at a faster rate when concentration levels are higher and release more heat into space when temperatures rise. These feedback factors and radiative forcings are poorly modeled or missing from the computer models that alarmists use to make their forecasts. The arguments are complex, but the debate over natural versus man-made climate change is unquestionably still ongoing. The more we learn, the less likely it becomes that human greenhouse gas emissions can explain more than a small amount of the climate change we witness.

***6) Alt causes---Yellowstone, China, India***

**Kreutzer** 12-14-**10** (David, Senior Policy Analyst in Energy Economics and Climate Change at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Data Analysis, Heritage, “EPA Can’t Regulate Volcanoes or China” <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/12/14/epa-can%e2%80%99t-regulate-volcanoes-or-china/>, jj)

An ongoing study in Yellowstone National Park seeks to measure the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) as a response to geologic activity and as a possible predictor of some geologic events. A [story covering this study](http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_0d6cd494-ebad-502d-88bc-0cb6eea6898b.html) notes that **researchers estimate that Yellowstone emits 45,000 tons of CO2 per day. That is about 16.5 million tons per year. The** [**EPA estimates**](http://www.epa.gov/oms/consumer/f00013.htm) **that the average car emits between five and six tons of CO2 per year. So natural geologic activity in Yellowstone contributes CO2 equivalent to about 3 million cars.** The current **attempts** by the EPA **to limit CO2 emissions** would [be dangerous for the American economy](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/05/EPA-Global-Warming-Regs-Dangerous), but they **would have no impact on the millions of tons Yellowstone emits every year**. More seriously, the EPA **regulations would also have little impact on the billions of additional tons of CO2 that China, India, and the developing world will emit each year in the decades ahead.** As a result, the regulations would have damaging impacts on the American economy, but just like cap-and-trade restrictions, **they would have** [**negligible impact on world temperatures**](http://www.masterresource.org/2009/05/part-i-a-climate-analysis-of-the-waxman-markey-climate-bill%E2%80%94the-impacts-of-us-actions-alone/).

***Massive size of oceans checks snowball and ensures slow timeframe.***

Bjørn **Lomborg,** Director, Environmental Assessment Institute, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST, 20**01**p. 189

But the **oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been astoundingly insignificant** **- the oceans contain more than 1,000 billion liters of water**. The UN’s overall evaluation of the oceans concludes: “**The open sea is still relatively clean**. **Low levels** of lead, synthetic compounds and artificial radionuclides, though widely detectable, **are biologically insignificant**. Oil slicks and litter are common among sea leans, but are, at present, **a minor consequences to communities of organisms living in ocean waters.**

***Alt causes and no impact***

Alt causes --- overfishing, etc

pH variation is inevitable --- has no impact

empirically denied by underwater springs --- they’re super acidic yet calcification happens

**Ridley 12** (Matt Ridley has been a scientist, journalist and businessman. With BA and DPhil degrees from Oxford University, he worked for the Economist for nine years as science editor, Washington correspondent and American editor, before becoming a self-employed writer and businessman. He was founding chairman of the International Centre for Life in Newcastle, January 7 2012, “Taking Fears of Acid Oceans With a Grain of Salt”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203550304577138561444464028.html>)

**Coral reefs around the world are suffering badly from overfishing and various forms of pollution. Yet many experts argue that the greatest threat to them is the acidification of the oceans from the dissolving of man-made carbon dioxide emissions. The effect of acidification, according to J.E.N. Veron,** an Australian coral scientist, **will be "nothing less than catastrophic**.... What were once thriving coral gardens that supported the greatest biodiversity of the marine realm will become red-black bacterial slime, and they will stay that way." **This is a common view**. The Natural Resources Defense Council has called ocean acidification "the scariest environmental problem you've never heard of." Sigourney Weaver, who narrated a film about the issue, said that "the scientists are freaked out." The head of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration calls it global warming's "equally evil twin." **But do the scientific data support such alarm? Last month scientists** at San Diego's Scripps Institution of Oceanography and other authors **published a study showing how much the pH level** (measuring alkalinity versus acidity) **varies naturally between parts of the ocean and at different times of the day, month and year. "On both a monthly and annual scale, even the most stable open ocean sites see pH changes many times larger than the annual rate of acidification**," say the authors of the study, adding that because good instruments to measure ocean pH have only recently been deployed, "**this variation has been under-appreciated." Over coral reefs, the pH decline between dusk and dawn is almost half as much as the decrease in average pH expected over the next 100 years. *The noise is greater than the signal.* Another recent study**, by scientists from the U.K., Hawaii and Massachusetts, **concluded that "marine and freshwater assemblages have always experienced variable pH conditions," and that "in many freshwater lakes, pH changes that are orders of magnitude greater than those projected for the 22nd-century oceans can occur over periods of hours." This adds to other hints that the ocean-acidification problem may have been exaggerated. For a start, the ocean is alkaline and in no danger of becoming acid** (despite headlines like that from Reuters in 2009: "Climate Change Turning Seas Acid"). **If the average pH of the ocean drops to 7.8 from 8.1 by 2100 as predicted, it will still be well above seven, the neutral point where alkalinity becomes acidity. The central concern is that lower pH will make it harder for corals, clams and other "calcifier" creatures to make calcium carbonate skeletons and shells. Yet this concern also may be overstated. Off Papua New Guinea** and the Italian island of Ischia, where natural carbon-dioxide bubbles from volcanic vents make the sea less alkaline, and off the Yucatan, **where underwater springs make seawater actually acidic, studies have shown that at least some kinds of calcifiers still thrive—at least as far down as pH 7.8.** In a recent experiment in the Mediterranean, reported in Nature Climate Change, **corals and mollusks were transplanted to lower pH sites, where they proved "able to calcify and grow at even faster than normal rates when exposed to the high [carbon-dioxide] levels** projected for the next 300 years." In any case, freshwater mussels thrive in Scottish rivers, where the pH is as low as five. **Laboratory experiments find that more marine creatures thrive than suffer when carbon dioxide lowers the pH level to 7.8. This is because the carbon dioxide dissolves mainly as bicarbonate, which many calcifiers use as raw material for carbonate. Human beings have indeed placed marine ecosystems under terrible pressure, but the chief culprits are overfishing and pollution.** By comparison, **a very slow reduction in the alkalinity of the oceans, well within the range of natural variation, is a modest threat, and it certainly *does not merit apocalyptic headlines.***

***Climate wars impact is bogus --- warming reduces conflict***

**Gartzke 11** (Erik Gartzke, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, Could climate change precipitate peace? , 9-21-11, Journal of Peace Research 49: 177-192, jj)

Where the basic science of climate change preceded policy, this second **consensus** among politicians and pundits **about climate and conflict formed in the absence of substantial scientific evidence**. **While anecdote and some focused statistical research suggests that civil conflict may have worsened in response to recent climate change in developing regions** (c.f., Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994; Burke et al., 2009), **these claims have been severely criticized by other studies** (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007; Buhaug et al., 2010; Buhaug, 2010). 1 In contrast, **the few long-term macro statistical studies actually find that conflict increases in periods of climatic chill** (Zhang et al., 2006, 2007; Tol & Wagner, 2010). 2 Research on the modern era reveals that **interstate conflict has declined in the second half of the twentieth century, the very period during which global warming has begun to make itself felt** (Goldstein, 2011; Hensel, 2002; Levy et al., 2001; Luard, 1986, 1988; Mueller, 2009; Pinker, 2011; Sarkees, et al., 2003). 3 While talk of a ‘climatic peace’ is premature, **assertions that global warming is injurious to world peace must be evaluated in light of countervailing evidence and contrasting causal claims**. 4 To understand why ***global warming can coincide with a reduction in interstate conflict***, it will be useful to recall that the contemporary situation differs from earlier eras of climate change to the degree that warming is a product of human activity. Human beings burn fossil fuels that produce greenhouse gases that lead to global warming. These same **fossil fuels propel economic and political systems that appear less inclined to certain forms of violent conflict** (Gartzke & Rohner, 2010, 2011). **Industrialization leads to economic development and democracy, each of which has been associated with peace. Prosperity** also **encourages international institutions and stabilizing global and regional hierarchies.** Thus, **global warming may coincide with peace**, while not actually inhibiting warfare. This study explores the relationship between climate change, liberal processes fueled by industrialization (development, democracy, international institutions), and interstate conflict. Previous studies of liberal peace have not paid much attention to climate change. Climatic peace may be yet another benefit purchased by all but accruing mostly to the developed world. At the same time, there might be trade-offs to consider in terms of the pace of development and the environment. The curvilinear relationship between development and interstate peace reported here and elsewhere (Boehmer & Sobek, 2005) suggests important advantages to increasing the pace of development, rapidly moving states through the ‘danger zone’ of partial industrialization. **If efforts to combat climate change cause nations to stagnate economically, then the world may unintentionally realize the worst fears of pundits and politicians for climate-induced conflict**. While the findings reported below clearly indicate that **the rise in global temperatures has not (yet) led to increased interstate conflict,** **there remains room for debate about whether global warming has** other deleterious, or even **beneficial, effects**. Under some conditions **climate change appears to reduce the frequency of interstate disputes**, though there is no compelling rationale for why this should be the case, even as this particular relationship is not robust with respect to the broadest set of coincident explanations. It may be too soon to provide a definitive answer to whether warming increases, reduces, or has no effect on interstate conflict, though of course waiting for more data also poses tradeoffs. Conversely, the consequences of global warming may well differ across countries and regions. Some states may become more violent under pressure from a warmer planet, even as other states or regions find greater cause for cooperation. For now, I focus on detailing global patterns of climate change and interstate conflict, a necessary first step.

***Empirics prove***

**Salehyan, ‘7** [Idean Salehyan, assistant professor of political science at the University of North Texas and coauthor of “Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link,” The New Myth About Climate Change, Foreign Policy, August 2007, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922&print=1>]

**Dire scenarios** like these may sound convincing, but they **are misleading**. Even worse, they are irresponsible, for they shift liability for wars and human rights abuses away from oppressive, corrupt governments. Additionally, focusing on climate change as a security threat that requires a military response diverts attention away from prudent adaptation mechanisms and new technologies that can prevent the worst catastrophes. First, aside from a few anecdotes, **there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically.** Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world**. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere?** For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But **famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters. Second, arguing that climate change is a root cause of conflict lets tyrannical governments off the hook. If the environment drives conflict, then governments bear little responsibility for bad outcomes. Thats why Ban Ki-moons case about Darfur was music to Khartoums ears. The Sudanese government would love to blame the West for creating the climate change problem in the first place**. True, desertification is a serious concern, but its preposterous to suggest that poor rainfall rather than deliberate actions taken by the Sudanese government and the various combatant factions ultimately caused the genocidal violence in Sudan. Yet **by Moons perverse logic, consumers in Chicago and Paris are at least as culpable for Darfur as the regime in Khartoum**. To be sure, resource scarcity and environmental degradation can lead to social frictions. Responsible, accountable governments, however, can prevent local squabbles from spiraling into broader violence, while mitigating the risk of some severe environmental calamities. As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has observed, no democracy has ever experienced a famine. Politicians who fear the wrath of voters usually do their utmost to prevent foreseeable disasters and food shortages. Accountable leaders are also better at providing public goods such as clean air and water to their citizens.